



A Critical Study on the Reasons of the Unity of the Truth of Existence in Ibn Arabī's Mystical school and Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn's Philosophy

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Abstract

The issue of existence is regarded as the most fundamental issues in philosophy and mysticism. It has always been important to discuss the truth of existence as the most fundamental issue in Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism and the subscription and dissociation point of these two sciences has been always important. Ibn Arabī, as a theorist of theoretical mysticism in the Islamic thought, considers the truth of existence as the central theme of this science, and other things are the manifestations, the dignity, the aspects and the emergence of this truth. There is just the existence of right. Existence is a single truth. In fact, there is no other than the single truth, and this truth is not multiplicative. In his school there are three arguments based on the immortality, the inexplicability, and the essentiality of existence. In Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn's thought, three arguments have been presented based on Sadrian's special meaning of causality, non-solitary of existence, and the Basit al-Haqiqah (simple truth). The article criticizes these arguments and examines the approach of the mystical school of Ibn Arabī and Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn.

Keywords: Truth of Existence; Unity; Ibn Arabī; Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn

Introduction

Existence has always been a subject both in philosophy and in mysticism, and it has been the point of presenting ideas and questions about it. Disagreements over the meaning of existence as a subject of philosophy and mysticism have had profound debates. But the question that comes to mind is what is meant by existence, and more precisely, what is the truth of existence? It seems that the existence cannot be discussed as a concept, because both the mystic and the philosopher want to speak the truth, not an imaginary or a fictitious issue, so the question is justified that what is meant by the existence and what is the topic of discussion. In view of the fact that Ibn Arabī's school has provided numerous explanations on this subject and Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn, in the Transcendental Wisdom, has referred all the philosophical issues to the correct sense of existence, it seems that the comparative study of the school perspective of these two thinkers helps to explain the truth of existence better. What is meant by the necessity of the truth of existence and its unity and what are the arguments of those believing in the unity of the truth of existence in the mystical school of Ibn Arabī and Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn and the critical examination of this argument is the subject of this article.

A) The Unity of the Truth of Existence in the Mystical School of Ibn Arabī

The First Argument: An Argument Based on the Immortality of Existence

Ibn Arabī has not presented any argument to prove the unity of the truth of existence, and essentially his method in presenting the mystical issues is not discursive. The seekers of his school offered theoretical arguments in this regard. Ibn Turke Isfihānī in his book *Tamhid al-Qawa'id* addresses an argument on the unity of the truth of existence which is based on the immortality of existence. In summary, the argument is that the truth of existence does not inherently accept the inexistence since it is a being, and whatever that accepts no absence, is intrinsically obligatory, and consequently the truth of existence is intrinsically obligatory since it is a being. (Ibn Turke, 1381: 210)

The trivial implication of the analogy is that if the truth of existence is inherently capable of accepting non-existence it may be bound to it and, if possible, it does not make any sense to be true, and yet this argument is void because it has two modes to consider whether it still holds true when it is annihilated and if necessary one of the repercussions is the existence or non-existence of one another, which is impossible or if nature does not have the nature of existence to become the nature of the non-nature which is again impossible, so both are impossible.

In this argument the truth of existence is intended as the truth of existence, and in fact, the truth of existence is intended without any constraint, not as a constraint.

In fact, the truth of existence has been considered since it is the truth of existence, not to be construed as a constraint. If every other constraint is taken alongside the truth of existence, then the truth of existence will no longer be the truth of existence. This necessity, which is proved for the truth of existence, is an eternity necessity because by definition the eternity necessity is the usual rely on the subject without any constraint, and here any constraint has been omitted. If the Truth of Existence does not exist in the eternity necessity, that is, in the essential necessity, or in any other necessity, there is an alienation in the immortality of the Truth, that is, in the considering the Existence on the Truth of Existence, there is a need for Predictive and Confirmatory Practices, and if any other practice is included, It will not be the Truth of Existence with its absence, so the Truth of Being is without any dignity immortal, beyond its Truth, so it exists in the necessity of eternity.

There may be some drawbacks to this argument (see Oshaqi, 1395, 116-134), including:

- 1) In Soqra (i.e. Minor) it is possible to deny the dignity of constraint, but it is not true in Kobra (i.e. Major) analogy that "everything which is intrinsically immortal is obligatory" because in the Kobra proposition only denies the dignity of constraint but the dignity of reasoning is not rejected, so the subject of this proposition can have a cause and it is not obligatory.
2. The proposition of (being is being) is evident and is regarded as the first definition, but the proposition (being exists) is not evident because the first proposition is fixity of something in itself, but (being exists) is not evident because the concept of existence implies the unconditional reality and this unconditionally encompasses existence and does not create contradiction.
3. In Kobra, the term "regarding its essence" denies the dignity of the constraint, Kobra, which is true, meaning that it does not admit inexistence until it exists of course it does not contradict this issue that its cause does not keep it and is mortal. And if denying the dignity of reasoning, the truth of the existence means infinite existence, that is, it is obligatory, but the desired unity does not prove the truth of existence, and if it denotes the unconditional existence, such existence is valid, and we have it only outside individuals, as a natural whole in the nature that exists with its people.

It is easy to answer these bugs with the basic words in the explanation of the argument. The answer to the first problem is to say that there is a unconditional existence in the Soqra state that does not accept any constraint and that it would be considered for the individual is the place of dispute that who the individual of this being is, not to divide it into obligatory and possible persons. The answer to the second problem is that if (existence exists) is not evident, that is to say, (existence doesn't exist), namely there is no existence in the existence that would be contrary to the assumption i.e. existence is mortal and will obtain absence.

The answer to the third problem is to say that the difference between the natural whole and the divisional unconditional existence is that the natural whole exists with its subjects and doesn't exist without them, but if there is no divisional unconditional existence, there is no need for self-denial because there is no existence in the natural whole. But in the reality of existence, existence is obtained and its absence requires contradiction.

The Second Argument: The Argument based on the Inexplicability of Existence

In the book "Tamhid al-Qawa'id, which describes the rules of Tawhid, this argument has been mentioned based on non-affectability of the existence.

In short, the argument is that the absolute existence is simple, non-effectible. So whatever is simple and non-effectible is intrinsically a must of the essentials, so the absolute existence is intrinsically a must of the essentials. On the one hand, the existence of the obligatory is not multiplicative, so there is no plurality in the existence. (Ibn Turke, 1381: 211)

Ibn Arabī also believes that the truth of existence is right because right existence is not to take it from another person, and who in the world has such a quality? Therefore, everything in the universe except Him is virtual in the sense that it is not the truth of existence but it is the grace of existence (Ibn Arabī, 1421, vol. 3: 81). Thus Ibn Arabī does not know the knowledge of the right to the mortality and also mortality in mortality. He rejects this view and believes that things do not exist and that which does not exist does not die because death is subordinate to existence, and when man knows his soul as non-existent and non-mortal, he has known God and there is no other way (Ibn Arabī, nd : 14) (Kashani, 1370: 1: 75)

It is clear that the meaning of the Absolute Existence is an existence free from any constraint, even the affirmative constraint, because if it has an affirmative constraint, it cannot be the truth of existence, but it will be bound to constraint.

On the other hand, this absolute being is not an effect, for if it is an effect it would require the primacy of the object to itself, which is impossible. The explanation is that if there is the existence is an effect, it requires a cause and we know that the cause has a priority over the effect. Is the same existence the cause of this being, or somebody from this being? If this is the existence, the object precedes itself, and if it is the individual, there is also a contradictory, because the nature of any object precedes the individual of that nature, therefore the existence precedes the individual of the existence, while it is assumed that the individual of the existence precedes the nature of the existence that needs the object precedes itself and it will be contradictory again. The result is that the absolute existence is not an effect. On the other hand, if the Absolute Existence is effect, it means it has an effect in itself and on the other hand it has no causality. This self-impose and effect implies a contradiction, meaning that there is no constraint for the absolute existence on the one hand, and on the other hand, it is bound to effect. The third argument is that if the Absolute Existence is an effect, then its cause, which is in the form of being, must be an effect, because it is true as a nature over its people, and vice versa.

In explaining the expand of existence, one can rely on the well-known argument that if existence has components, it is in fact composite, one can ask whether the components are existent or not if they are not existence, so they are non-existent and lacking any object, and if they are existence, they are composite and need to its components so existence will need to existence that has a rotten tale like that the existence takes precedence over itself. There is also a tendency in Kobra analogy, that is, expand and non-affectability with the obligation of existence.

A creature that is both expand and non-effect is necessarily a must. The relevance of these two things is obvious because what is not an effect and on the one hand there is no compound in it is the Necessary Being which, according to the arguments of non-plurality, the Necessary Being will be unified, so the Absolute Being will be Necessary and Unique.

The Third Argument: Argument based on the Intrinsic Existence

Qaysari, the commentator of *fusus al-hikam* written by ibn Arabī, has provided an argument based on the intrinsic existence. In short, the argument is that the intrinsic existence exists, and whatever that exists intrinsically, it is obligatory for the natures to exist, so the existence of the necessary being is intrinsic. (Qaysari, 1996, 18)

It is clear that in the Soqra analogy, the existence for the being is taken into account intrinsically namely it does not mean that there is a supreme being because this intermediary and the redundant subject is either existent or eliminated that cannot be intermediated in being, and if it exists, to which being it has been existed, naturally, either intrinsically, or by another being that requires succession, so the intrinsic existence exists. And there is no other criterion than the existence itself, which implies that there is any dignity, including the dignity of the existence, and it is the criterion of its existence. In Soqra analogy, Qaysari believes that what is available without any intermediary and that it is the criterion of its existence is obligatory because it is impossible to separate the essence of the thing from itself. The explanation is that existence, for a being that has it intrinsically, if not necessary, is possible or abstained. It is neither abstained nor possible, since if possible, it can be mortal, so it cannot become existence for the intrinsic existence, so one side remains and that is the necessity of existence. On the one hand, the being and the existent are the same based on Soqra and the denial of one from the other is impossible, so when both the denial of the being from the existent and the denial of the existent from the being is abstained, the other side remains that the necessity for existence is proved, that is, an object whose denial is intrinsically abstained, necessarily, it will be obligatory for existence, so the being which is the intrinsic existent is necessarily obligatory. Ibn Arabī has also mentioned the essence of the conscience of existence, and says in the Fotuhat:

"اعلم ان الوجود عند القوم وجدان الحق في الوجد"

(Ibn Arabī, nd, v. 2: 538)

It means that the truth exists in the state of ecstasy and about the meaning of ecstasy it has been said that:

"الوجد ما يصادف القلب من الاحوال المغيبة له عن شهود الوجود بوجدان الحق في الوجد"

(Ibn Arabī, 1421: 169)

Ecstasy is an unseen spark that conquer the seeker's heart and dominates his verdict, which is the same unseen and secrets, on the heart of seeker so that he does not see his intuition as he does not see himself namely the witness, but only sees the visible which is the very existence of truth.

B) The Unity of the Truth of Existence in Şadr al-Muti'allihīn's Views

Before entering the discussion, it is important to note that the understanding of Sadrian philosophy, or the same transcendent wisdom, depends on the manner in which Şadr al-Muti'allihīn confronts the issues in his books. He first enters the debate in the way of his predecessors, then presents his own criticism and moderate opinion, and finally gives his final opinion. (See Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 1, p. 71)

His meaning of the truth of existence must be examined.

In some of his works he considers the truth of existence including some degrees that this is his average opinion (Shirazi, 1417, v. 1: 7)

In Ayqaz al-Naemin, he argues that the meaning of the truth of existence is the same almighty God. (Shirazi, 1361: 11) Of course, the ideas of Şadr al-Muti'allihīn about the almighty God is different, whether it is the same unconditional existence or the divisive unconditional existence. In Mafatih al-Qayb he has a tendency to the unconditional existence:

It is known that the truth of existence is a witness to himself that is old and there is no partner for him in the obligations which are the perfection of being. (Shirazi, 1363: 240)

From the viewpoint of Şadr al-Muti'allihīn, it is only God who is the Truth of Existence and other than Him does not benefit from the Truth of Existence:

The most obvious objects are the Absolute Being because the Existence is Absolute and He is the Necessary Truth of Transcendence, except that the almighty God is the existence of everything because He is the Truth of Existence and there is no lack in Him, and if no existence has a way in him, He will not be expanding the nature, and He will be not be mere existence, so he is merely the truth of being which is the being of all beings, so that his essence is not an object out of things and he is the essence and truth in being, and other than Him are dignities. (Shirazi, 1360 :37) in this view the truth of being is obligatory in the obligatory and is possible in the possible (Shirazi, 1981: v. 1: 404) but Şadr al-Muti'allihīn's true attitude to the truth of existence is the same divisive unconditional existence that has been dealt with in his works:

He is the Truth and the rest are His Dignity and He is the Essence and the rest are His Names and He is the Origin and the rest are His Companions (Shirazi, 1382: 172) and (Nasr, 2001, 1: 647)

Mulla Sadra, in expressing the relation and division of objects with right, also quotes words beyond mystics. He says about the division of obligatory and possibility:

This division is due to the privilege between the existence and the essence and the opposition between the direction of deity and servitude, but regarding the mere being and the real unity, there is no real necessity until it is bound to the intrinsic possibility, because what is obligatory is possible, which surrounds the possibility arising from the determination of existence by the existence of the truth itself, so that the origin of the possibility is somehow of scientific consideration. (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 2: 312)

In his statement, Mulla Sadra proposes a monotheistic monotheism in which truth is on the essence of its innate unity that there is no exemplary, shared, or antithetical to him, and that is the extreme of monotheism (Shirazi, 1370, Vol. 3: 69). So the fact is that the disposition of a particular name for deity's essence and existential identity is irrelevant, regardless of kinship and extras, because that essence is unreasonable to human beings and cannot be referred to by sense and reason ... so it has neither a name nor an official and attribute (Shirazi, *ibid*: 78)

Most of the mystical theories of Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn are in the second volume of *Asfar*, and the proof of unity of existence has been expressed at the end of this volume. His two arguments in this volume are based on the relation between cause and effect and the reference of effect to the dignity for the cause as well as on the basis of the absence of absolute existence. Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn's third argument has been based on the very principle of "بسيط الحقيقه كل الاشياء".

1) *Argumentation Through Causality*

In explaining the relation of cause and effect with regard to the foundations of his philosophy, Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn introduces the effect as the dependence on causality, as well as on the relation between cause and effect. Strictly speaking, the effect is not the object, for which there is a relation but it is the relation itself. The effect has no independent identity of its own. Any reference to it is impossible without regarding the cause:

What is known as an effect does not have an expressive truth with the truth of its cause until reason can refer to the identity of the effect in essence, irrespective of the identity of the one who has given existence to the effect until they become two independent in independent identities, one as *Mafiz* and the other *Mafaz*, since in this way it is necessary to have an intrinsic effect separate from that which has an effect meaning, since it is reasoned without rationalizing its cause and adding to its cause. (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 2, pp. 299-300)

Another expression of this relevance is that if the effect has an independent essence which is not the same as relation, that is, there is a relation for the object, there will be no need for cause, and this is contrary to causality relation.

When we abstract the cause from what is not within its causality and its effect, that which is causal and effective, and also abstract the effect from what is not within its effect, it becomes clear to us that every cause is a cause upon his essence and truth and any effect is the effect upon its essence and truth. (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 299)

Forgery and existence are one and in other words creation and existence are one. This question is subordinate to the question of the authenticity of existence, because the truth of the existence of the effect is the creation of the effect by the cause. The creation of causality is the very existence of the effect, and it is not that it would be the creation and forgery is something and the existence is something else. In this attitude the creation of effect is the same as the being of effect and its forgery by the cause is the same and creation is a bridge that shows if we have an independent view to the effect, we realize its existence, otherwise the existence of the effect is the same as relation to the cause. The effect with this validity has no truth except that it is added and has no meaning except that it is an effect and function without an essence being implicit in these meanings (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 200).

Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn's phrase is explicit that it does not have an innate effect by itself, and even to refer to it as an effect and function is merely to refer to a relation to the cause and is therefore not innate and has no truth. Then what exactly is the existence of effect? And what has to do with the cause. The answer to this question is identified in the following phrase of Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn, which reads:

It became clear that for all the main beings there is one unique origin which is the truth and the rest are His dignities, He is the essence and the other are His names and attributes. He is the origin and the other are His dignity and He is the existence and beyond Him are His directions and prestige. (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 300)

Does creation belong cause or effect? It is clear that it belongs to the cause, not the effect, because the effect does not have the essence and the truth. So the verdicts that are carried on the cause and all the dignities that are given to the effect do not really belong to it, but all the verdicts belong to the cause. And there is no truth except Him, and no creature except Him. To exemplify this, one may refer to the Sadrian attitude towards the soul as the powers of the soul are effect to the soul, but due to this attitude, what is the relation between the powers and the soul and what is their truth? According to Şadr al-Muti'allihīn, the powers of the soul are related to the existence of the soul, so there is no essence and truth to them and they have no autonomy. These powers are dignities and degrees of soul, so they are the very act of the soul and in their order the soul does its own act. (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 6, p. 377) In this view, causality is not a two-way relationship, which has two independent parties that one is cause and the other is effect, but the effect is the same dignity of a single truth:

What we first expressed was that there is a cause and effect it the existence that ultimately comes to this conclusion that in the mystical way we understand that cause is a real thing and that the effect is one way of its ways and the causality of the cause and its cause on the effect. (Shirazi 1981: v. 2, 301)

2) *The Argument of Lack of Finite in the Existence*

One of Mulla Sadra's arguments that has been presented in the second volume of Asfar is based on lack of finite of existence. His words are:

The existence of the almighty God is free from all defects because He is complete and supreme in His essence and He is perfect in supreme perfection because He is infinite in strength and intensity which may not be above His perfection, which is upon His essence, and in the order to His constancy; and whatever other than Him are His grace and the glimmers of His light which come after the fullness and perfection of His essence. (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 305)

This argument can be formulated as follows:

The existence of the right is infinite and has no defect. Whatever is infinite and without any defect is impossible to imagine someone else for him.

It is argued in detail that this argument has been argued with regard to the lack of finite and non-defect in the essence of truth to the unity of truth. The fact that the right is not finite is itself a positive proposition, as finite is a non-existence and non-existence is absence, and denial of deny is referred to as necessity. This lack of finite differs from that of numbers or other finites. In fact this lack of finite is true in the truth and other things are potential. Since lack of finite can be addressed in both substantive and existential affairs, it is at the outset of the argument for "the existence of right" that lack of finite is the lack of existential finite not a substantive finite. In fact, this being is infinite in that it exists without any restriction, no annex, and no finite of any dignity. Therefore, the immortality in the material world should not be compared with the immortality in the essence of existence.

Given the principle of lack of finite in existence, one can rightly assume that any being that has such a character that is infinite does not leave a place for others.

The necessity for the right to be infinite in existence is that no other existent exists independently of the right, so that it can exist without dependence on the existence of the right, so the being and the existence will not have more than one real thing, which is the same almighty God, and the plurality of possibilities should all be interpreted in the heart namely the one and infinite truth, not in the breadth or length of the existence of truth. (Jawādī Āmulī, 1395, Vol. 9, p. 456)

In this argument with regard to the lack of finite in the existence, the unity of the truth of existence has been addressed, but one can ask the question what is the difference between lack of finite and Sirāfat?

Can't Sirāfat be regarded as the lack of finite and this argument is referred to as the mere rule of "صرف الشيء لا يتنى ولا يتكرر"?

We will answer this question in the review and critique.

3) *The Argument of Bisātat of Right*

Undoubtedly, the rule (بسيط الحقيقه كل الاشياء و ليس بشيء منها) is one of the most important rules of Islamic philosophy used by Mulla Sadra. In this rule, it is very important to understand and imagine the term Basīt. The summary of the argument is that the obligatory being is Basīt al-Haqīqah, and that which is Basīt al-Haqīqah is all things, so is the almighty God is all things and there is nothing outside Him (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 368).

Bisātat (i.e. expand) is the opposite of composition, and it has a variety of forms, including the usual external compound such as elemental composition, quantitative composition, matter-form composition, philosophical credit composition, composition of existence and nature, composition of sex and season, and composition of existence of conscience and absence. So the very meaning of the term Basīt al-Haqīqah is that it does not have any compound thing, because if it is compound, it is possible and it is not Basīt and necessary. If there is too much in the end, it will be necessary. On the other hand, this Basīt al-Haqīqah has all things because if it lacks things it will have a combination of conscience and absence which contradicts its Bisātat. On the other hand, the objects are the manifestation of this Basīt al-Haqīqah, not an independent being beside him, which, if so, would be the reason for the absence of this existence in the Basīt al-Haqīqah. So there is no being outside of him, and every being outside of him is in fact his appearance. Şadr al-Muti'allihīn writes in this regard:

Know that it is obligatory existence is Basīt al-Haqīqah at the extreme Bisātat, so any Basīt al-Haqīqah that is such is the all objects. So the obligatory existence is all things, and nothing is out of it. To argue that if something is out of his true identity, his essence will be the example of the denial of that object, otherwise the denial of denial is equal to the fixity, so the object is not a present thing in him. We assumed it was absent. On the other hand, when denying that object is true to him, his essence will be a combination of the truth of something and except the truth of something.

And this combination, even in the sense of reason, is still compound, though it is simply assumed that it is the wrong one (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 2, p. 369).

Given this, it is clear to Şadr al-Muti'allihīn that he thinks that one can come from expand of truth to the unity of truth and that other things are His manifestation and not an existence near His being. While Ibn Arabī has a tendency from the right to Bisātat and non-combination:

In Ibn Arabī's view, the truth of existence is united and there is no multiplicity in it:

Know that the truth of existence is one, with no multiplication, it is multiplied by the manifestations that one needs. Therefore, it is multiplied and becomes spirits and objects and meanings (Ibn Arabī, 2003: 128).

Ibn Arabī also states in the Meccan conquests that the truth of existence is unified and that there is no plurality and multiplicity in it, and if there is a plurality in the existence, there is a plurality of

ancestry and ordinances, and that plurality is non-existent and therefore the existence is right. (Ibn Arabī, 1405, v. 4: 268 and v. 5: 585)

Critique and Review

By presenting the explanations and arguments put forward in the mystical school of Ibn Arabī and Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn's thought, one can take a closer look at these two schools of thought towards unity of being:

1) To consider existence as it is, that is to say, truth as it is, and to consider it without any limitations, its first image and concept is necessity and unity. The first argument in the mysticism of Ibn Arabī suggested that this truth is necessary, but the point here is how to understand the intrinsic necessity by the truth of existence? In other words, this understanding is not an argument, but rather an explanation of the notion that has been affirmed. If we look closely at understanding the truth of existence, can anything be understood except the intrinsic necessity? Is there any other existence other than the truth of existence that wants to be considered as non-existent, and the discussion of necessity and vice versa? No. Where there is a discussion of the truth, there is no possibility or refusal to argue the necessity. So this seems to be a purely analytical discussion, not an argumentative one, and with a detailed understanding of the subject, the predicate will also be concluded.

This is also the case in the second argument, that is, when one considers the truth of existence, there is no causality for him, let alone the effect and the negation of the causality of the truth of existence. When the truth of existence is contemplated, all constraints are raised in the second stage of reasoning about him. So it seems that the journey from the inexplicability of the truth of existence to the necessity of being is also not explicitly conceived in the realm of conception, but rather it is seemingly a journey from the obvious to the hidden, though it may seem appropriate to educate those in the realm of pluralism. Qaysari's argument can also be referred to the first argument that apart from the truth of existence there is no other being that can be considered as non-existent, and then talk about its intrinsic or absence and finally come to the necessity of existence.

Given these cases, the three arguments in Ibn Arabī's mysticism can be regarded as punitive rather than argumentative. Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn's first argument is based on explaining the causality and the attitude of plurality towards unity. More precisely, he seeks to correct the pluralistic view to causality and existence, and to refer the effect to the development of causation, and thus there will be nothing but a single existence. The truth is that this argument can be referred to as the inexplicability proof of existence. In that argument too, existence had no cause, and of course no effect.

In this argument, the effect also has no existent cause, and it has nothing but its own dignity and manifestation. Although Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn does not explicitly state his understanding of mysticism in this argument, one can understand he is affected in this argument, though he implicitly considers his arguments to be separate from the arguments of mystics and in the same section of the cause and effect section of Asfar's second volume, he has commanded the newness of his argument (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 1, 71).

In the second argument, Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn has come to the conclusion that there is a lack of finite in the existence of right, which still has forms of mystical arguments, because if the existence of the right is regarded as the truth of existence, there is no need to deny the existence of other being and reach from the lack of finite in the existence to the lack of others in the existence. Finite and lack of finite are secondary concepts that have an image toward the truth of hidden existence and cannot be considered as the middle ground of the argument. In the third argument, Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn moves from the Bisātat of

the existence to the necessity of the existence and the unity of existence, so the forms of past proofs are also true about this argument. The author believes that understanding a correct conception of the truth of existence and the existence of one's right is a correct and precise way of understanding the necessity of this truth and even the unity of this truth, and the arguments in the mystical and Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn's terms are merely explanatory in the sense of punitive rather than discursive and logical.

2) How do unity and plurality come to mind? Islamic philosophers seem to regard pluralism as subordinate to unity; since if there is no unity, no plurality can be achieved because plurality is required by unity, not by necessity. Given this contemplation, in the conventional and non-scientific sense, the plurality and unity are considered along each other, but in the strict scientific view, plurality is subordinate to unity and unity is regarded as a secondary philosophical rationality. The question of whether the existence is single or plural is meaningless because unity is the principle and plurality is a credit of the multiplicity and repetition of unity. Now if we speak of the truth of existence, exactly which unity and multiplicity do we validate? Clearly none. Basically there is really no constraint in the truth of existence. How do we get from uncertainty to unity? It is obvious that we give a constraint to the fact that it makes it out of uncertainty. But the fundamental question is, have not Muslim mystics and Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn considered this issue? The appearance of their words is that they saw unity so inextricably in existence that they have begun to reject unity in the fact of existence. If the truth exists and if it has no cause, it has no finite, it is Basit, of course there is one unit but one that does not have two, and it means the unity of the true right. In my opinion, if the truth of existence were to be raised as such, there would be no need for the unity of truth of existence, for unity of determinism would give rise to the fact that it would remove indeterminacy, and that unity could only be considered in the first determination of right. Not as a constraint for the principle of the truth of existence.

3) Some of the expressions of mystics and Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn have been mentioned that even fear from introducing the truth of existence to the truth of being, and this fear is to depart from the contradiction of the truth of existence, so the expressions they have are usually entitled as right, existence of right, truth of existence and even title of Ho. This shows that both thinkers have a firm belief that they should use titles that exclude any constraint from that truth and repel any designation. It seems to the author that the title of the truth or the right is a better title that refers to that unseen identity and the divisive unconditional existence because it excludes other constraints that are usually manifest as well.

That is why Qaysari in the preface of *Fusus al-Hikam* says:

«الفصل الاول فى الوجود و أنه هو الحق»

(Qaysari, 1375: 4).

Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn seems to use this term as the Basit al-Haqiqah rather than Basit al-Wujud.

4) The mere imagination of the object is the infinite notion of that object because it has nothing to do with the end, and if it has no end, it will not be mere and mixed with the absence of object or other object, so it will not be mere that is the opposite of assumption. With this in mind, it can be said that lack of finite can be referred to mere etymology of object and one can provide an argument based of the etymology of existence that leaves no room for others and deduces the necessity and unity of the truth of existence. This etymology of existence cannot be repeated, so it has no second example.

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