



Crisis Management Patterns in the Lives of Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH); a Case Study of the Economic Crisis

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Abstract

A crisis is an unexpected and sometimes growing event that imposes problems on society and becomes an acute and unstable situation for individuals or society, the solution of which requires fundamental measures. In the history of Shiite Imamate, the years 203 to 260 AH (819 to 874 B. C.) are dedicated to the leadership and supervision of Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH), those Imamas who were the offsprings of Imam Reza (PBUH). Friendship with Imam Javad, Imam Hadi and Imam Askari (PBUH) was being led to consequences such as confiscation of property, dismissal from work, poverty and destitution. By taking measures and making decisions, Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) were able to improve the unfavorable economic situation of the Shiites. This article, which was organized by descriptive-analytical method, summarizes the actions of the late Shiite Imams in order to prevent and prepare confrontational and deterrent strategies in three stages: "before the crisis", "during the crisis" and "after the crisis". This article has categorized and introduced management principles that can be considered by citizens in the present era.

Keywords: *Ibna al-Reza (PBUH); Crisis; Crisis Management; Economics*

1. Introduction

In traditional division, the crises of human societies are divided into two types: "natural crisis" and "man-made crisis". Of particular importance is the formation of capable management which greatly

reduces the amount of damage and, as soon as possible, returns to the pre-crisis state by employing the right and proper methods, by controlling the critical situation.

Shi'ite Imams, as the successors of the Holy Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) were to guide and lead all the people, especially the Shiites; this guidance included religious, political, social and economic areas. In the ziarat Jame'ah Kabirah "pilgrimage of the Great Society", in addition to describing the Imams as "Carriers of the Book of God" and "The Prophet's Messengers" they are also described as "People's Leader", "Qualified Leaders" and "Politicians and Rulers over All Servants" (Majlisi, 1986a) which illustrates the different aspects of their leadership in Islamic society. Those noblemen have endured crises throughout their lives, sometimes from the opposition and sometimes from some Shiites. Crisis management has special manifestation in the context of the latter Shiite Imams, for whom we use the term "Ibna al-Reza (PBUH)" to refer to them. His majesty and the Shiites were economically disadvantaged. This critical situation has led to the emergence of special management of this Imam (PBUH).

Since the governing principles of today's societies are not absolute or not allowed to be applied in all Islamic societies, it is, therefore, necessary to apply a particular Islamic management style in such societies, given the necessity of governing divine values. Familiarity with the management patterns of Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) will be helpful while dealing with critical situations to take advantage of their management style. The present article seeks to answer the question of how their management in such conditions was in the light of the aforementioned steps, in a descriptive-analytical way, using historical statements and narrations involving the history of Ibn al-Reza (PBUH). It should be noted that the selection of Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) in extracting crisis management patterns is due to the similarity in many economic and political conditions with today's society and less focus on the lives of late Imams and less familiarity with Shiites, while research by the authors of the present study has so far shown that the crisis management model in Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) has not been found.

2. Definition of Crisis

Familiarity with the word crisis has made the concept be presumed as something obvious, but the reality is that the definition of crisis is pervasive because of its pervasive influence on all aspects of human life, whether it is social, economic, political, cultural, and so on. So, politicians, managers, scholars, economists, psychologists, and other scholars in various fields of science have each used the word crisis, and have provided various definitions of the term in their work. Some of them will be mentioned below.

Crisis is a Greek word in Arabic (Dekhoda, 1998). In Berg's view, crisis is a turning point in the course of anything such as time, stage or event, the outcome of which determines whether or not unpleasant consequences occur (Berg, 1994). The term crisis has entered into managerial and social discourses from medical science (Berg, 1994); therefore, in dictionaries, we see most of the semantic meanings of medical science as shifting from one state to another that is being healthy or ill. The former is interpreted as good crisis and the latter as bad crisis (Hosseini Zabidi, 1927) or sudden change in severe illness (Ibn al-Ma'ar, 1984). Dekhoda has defined the crisis as a change in the state of fever for the sick (Dekhoda, 1998). Barnet sees crisis as a combination of chains that begin with an event and are followed by conflict, ending in the most severe state of disruption (Barnet, 1998). Peru defines the crisis as an incident, defining it as a disorder that poses major problems and endangers the system and keeps it running (unlike an accident) (Peru, 2011).

Gonzalez-Herrero and Parth see crisis as a mechanism that traverses birth, growth, puberty and decline or death). Greener, Lipit, and Schmidt consider crises to be disruptive impacts on changes in the organizational life cycle (cited in Hosseini, 2006). They appear in any form at any time (Ash, 2004) and create a situation for the individual, group, or organization that cannot be dealt with in conventional ways

(Cook, 2015). Anomalies in which normal management patterns are not responsive to these conditions (Barnett, 1998).

Summing up these various definitions, it can be said that "crisis is a situation that has five essential aspects: a sudden event, affecting the lives of a significant number of people in the community, disruption or a cut in the ordinary course of affairs, with material damages and spirituality and the need to take immediate decisions and actions" (Salavatian, 2010).

3. The Economic Crises of the Era of Abna al-Reza (PBUH)

Based on what has been stated in the definition of the crisis and the expression of the characteristics of the crisis, it can be said: Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) and the Shiites were in a critical situation, with factors contributing to its occurrence:

3.1. Political Factors

The economy of any society depends on the political status of that society. Bani Abbas first came to power with the support of the Alawites, but later turned friendship into animosity and considered the belief in the Imamate of Ibna Al-Reza as a clear example of their struggle against the government and punished such things as confiscation of property and dismissal from office. The offenders were considered (Yaqubi, 2010). During the Imamate of Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH), political unrest had a significant impact on the recession and the spread of poverty. Most of the government's income was through taxation and alms (Zidane, 1993). Regardless of the economic situation of the people, the caliphs were heavily taxed by the people around them, as well as by the government of the country (Zidane, 1993). Although the government's annual income sometimes amounted to some 500 million dirhams, the general population was still in poverty, so that they did not have the least living opportunities (Shoghi, 1707). Poetry has also been described in the language of poets in the form of poetry (Baihaqi, 1999). Although general poverty was a prominent feature of the people of that time, the Alawites were in critical condition. Especially the Alawites of Madinah, in other words, who were imprisoned and deprived of the necessities of life. If anyone helped the Alawites, they would be severely punished (Esfahani, 1999).

During this time, eight Abbasid caliphs took over the caliphate, Ma'mun, Mu'tasim, Wathiq, Mutawakel, Montaser, Musta'in, Mu'ataz, Muhtadi, and Mo'atamed, whose policies toward Shiite society were different. Based on economic situation of the Shiites was accompanied by ups and downs.

Vasegh and Montaser treated the Shiites well. Yahya ibn Aktham in this regard says: no one has done as much good to the Alawites as he has done, and when he passed away, there was no poor person among them (Suyuti, 1997). Tax forgiveness (Ibn Athir, 1991) and determining a pension for the Talebians of Samarra and providing living expenses were among his other actions (Isfahani, 1999). Despite the short time of his caliphate - about 6 months - (Massoudi, 2004), Montaser also treated the Alawites better, such as returning Fadak and endowments to the Alawites. This love compelled the poets to praise and glorify him (Massoudi, 2004).

Ma'mun and Mu'tasim also adopted a dual policy. For example, Ma'mun returned Fadak to the Alawites (Blazeri, 1988). He adjusted the literacy tax in favor of its payers and reduced the treasury's share to two-fifths instead of half production, although Ma'mun sought to support prominent Alawite figures and literacy farmers. The revolutionary Alawites should be cut off (Hussein, 1998); but sometimes, it showed its anti-Alawite policy, for example, in 210 AH, the people of Qom complained to Ma'mun about the amount of tax and asked him to reduce its amount. They did, but Ma'mun did not accept. They also refused to pay taxes. This led to a war between the Ma'mun Corps and the people of Qom. With the

defeat of the Qomites, they were forced to pay seven million dirhams in taxes instead of the initial amount of two million (Blazeri, 1988).

Regarding Mutasim's behavior, Jassem Hussein believes that during the time of Imam Hadi (PBUH), due to the good economic situation of the government, the ability of Alawite supporters to conduct military operations had decreased) But Taqoush considers Motasem's policy towards the Alawites to be very strict (Taqoush, 2009). One example is tax increases. Ali Ibn Mahziar's letter to Imam Hadi (PBUH) in this regard (Tusi, 1985) and also Sistani's personal request to Imam Javad (PBUH) for intercession in reducing its amount are among the confirmations of this opinion (Tusi, 1985).

Other caliphs, including Mutawakkil, refused to pay the Bait al-Mal to the Shiites and were so hard on them that Yahya ibn Umar al-Alawi wrote to the caliphs as follows: Take it to the Abbasids. If the world is yours, give us a portion of it to your cousins and your property, which is closer to a just government (Bukhari, 1993). During the days of the caliphate of the Musta'een and the caliphs after him, many Alawites revolted due to the difficult political and economic conditions (Yaqubi, 2010). On the other hand, uprisings, riots, and wars had adverse economic consequences, including the conflict between the descendants of Mu'tasim, Mu'taz, and Musta'in, over Sarkhlaft in 252 AH, which resulted in maritime communication routes and Baghdad's land was cut off and cargo ships were burned, resulting in a halt in imports. This also led to a shortage of goods and an increase in prices (Yaqoubi, 2010).

3.2. *Natural and Unnatural Events*

In addition to the political situation, other factors contributed to the economic crisis; natural and unnatural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, fires, etc., such as the several Tigris floods, made the economic situation of the people of Baghdad difficult. Also, in 234 AH, due to wind, agricultural products were destroyed (Ibn Taghri Bardi, 1963). During the period of 240 to 656 AH, the Baghdad bazaar was repeatedly set on fire, which caused irreparable damage to the merchants, on the other hand, the shortage of goods and, consequently, the high cost to the people (Tanukhi, 1995).

3.3. *Deviated Groups*

Sometimes the economic crisis was caused by some Shiite sects, such as grain, Zaydi or Waqfiya. For example, Qassem Rassi has criticized the collection of religious funds and the establishment of an advocacy organization by writing a treatise called *Al-Rad Ali al-Rafdah*. The study of this book could have made the Shiites doubt the payment of religious funds to the Imams and in this regard, it could have caused a crisis (Nouri, 2000). In some cases, some corrupt lawyers and false claimants were the cause of the crisis, which we will discuss below.

3.4. *Shiite Economic Siege*

Mutawakkil was considered one of the fierce enemies of the Alawite tribe (Isfahani, 1999) and expelled the Shiites from government positions and disturbed their position in the eyes of the public. For example, he expelled Ishaq ibn Ibrahim for being a Shiite from the rule of Samarra and Sirvan in Jabal province. For this reason, other people also lost their positions (Pishvaei, 2006). He gave orders to the ruler of Egypt, including the deprivation of the Alawites of Egypt of property, horse riding, and having more than one slave, and ordered the exile of the Taliban to Iraq, and the ruler transferred them to Iraq and then to Medina in 236 AH. There, too, the Alawites lived in a place separate from others, in such a way that they were deprived of even the minimum necessities of life (Hussein, 1998). Fadak (Mousavi, 2018) as a source of income for the Alawites and the Shari'a right of the Ahl al-Bayt, which at that time earned more than twenty-four thousand dinars (Majlisi, 1989a), to one of his supporters to He named Abdullah ibn Umar ibn Baziar (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, 1984.). This economic siege caused the Alawites to

become poor and destitute. As they were deprived of a meal and due to the severity of poverty, one of them hung his sword and the other sold his clothes (Kharazmi, 1933) or it is stated in a narration that during the caliphate of Mutawakel, a group of Alawite women in Medina were deprived of a handful of clothes, so that during prayers, they all took turns wearing old clothes, and their livelihood was through spinning. Omar ibn Faraj Rakhji, the governor of the two holy shrines, who was appointed by Mutawakkil, did not allow the people to do good to the Alawites (Isfahani, 1999).

On the other hand, there was no poverty among all Shiites in the Islamic world. However, it can be said that in most areas there were economic restrictions and pressures, because at that time it was difficult to earn halal income, as Imam Hadi (PBUH) told one of the Shiites in this regard: Halal income is rarer at this time than anything else. You are in a time when nothing at this time is scarcer than halal money (Majlisi, 1989) and this indicates the bad economic situation of that day. Another statement in this regard is the letters that the Shiites have written to Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) in which they have complained about their financial difficulties and situation. For example, Abu Amr al-Hudha'i wrote a letter to Imam Hadi (PBUH) through Ali ibn Mahziar in Basra and informed the Imam (PBUH) of his poverty (Klini, 1987). It was so hard on the Shiites that one of the Shiites of Imam Hadi (PBUH) named Abu Musa cut off his salary only because he was one of the friends and Shiites of the Imam (PBUH); he asked for his mediation to solve his problem (Majlisi, 1989). The sediment of critical conditions can be seen even in jurisprudential questions; for example, we should mention the question of Muhammad ibn Isa, which was asked of Imam Hadi (PBUH), if a person leaves something of his property for you, but needs it, Is it permissible to seize it and remove it again (Ibn al-Babawiyah, 1985) All this evidence indicates unfavorable economic conditions, because after abandoning the share of Imam (PBUH), they soon needed it.

One of the economic problems of the time of Imam Askari (PBUH) was that the enemies of the Imams became responsible for Shiite property and endowments in order to put them in financial difficulties and protect them from their uprising, for example Ahmad ibn Obaidullah Ibn Khaqan was in charge of endowments and alms in Qom and was very hostile to the Ahl al-Bayt (PBUH) (Klini, 1987); therefore, it was difficult for Shi'ite Imams and even Shiites to make a living. Muhammad ibn Ali Waqifi of the religion also finds it difficult to live because of poverty, so they went to Imam Askari (PBUH) with his father, because they were aware of his generosity (Kleini, 1987).

3.5. Weakening the Financial Strength of Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH)

One of the financial resources of Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) to protect the Shiite community was the religious funds of the Shiites, who sometimes had difficulty receiving it.

3.6. Seizure of Sharia Funds

Sometimes, the religious funds of the Shiites were confiscated by the government and deviant currents, such as traitorous lawyers or claimants, before they were received by Ibna al-Reza (PBUH).

3.7. Government

The Abbasid caliphs took control of the Imams (PBUH) and the Shiites and if they see that the property has been confiscated, as has been stated before, the Mutawakkil officers, according to their reports, were constantly raiding the house of Imam Hadi (PBUH) in order to confiscate the property.

3.8. Deviation Groups

Some deviant currents claimed people's property by claiming to be associated with the Imams, and others refused to pay their religious dues by denying their Imamate.

3.9. *Waqfiya*

Waqfiyah, which was headed by Ali ibn Abi Hamza Batayani (Najashi, 1996), has refused to pay the religious funds since the Imamate of Imam Reza (PBUH) (Kashi, n.d.) and this process continued until the time of Imam Askari (PBUH).

3.10. *Traitor Lawyers and Claimants of Lawyering*

The position of representing the Imams was a valuable position for the Shiites. Their lawyers also had respect and social status among Shiites. They also, as trustees of the Shiites and the Imams, received the religious funds and gifts of the Shiites and handed them over to the Imams. These two characteristics, namely the social and economic aspect of the position of advocate, caused the organization to suffer from internal and external organizational crises, the consequences of which were noticed by the Imams and the Shiites. Sometimes the privileges of this position tempted people to claim the power of attorney of the Imams in order to have a social status among the people or to receive their property for themselves, and to use the benefits of this position with this false claim.

It should be noted that sometimes corrupt and deviant ideas were the reason why it can be considered an extra-organizational crisis; sometimes some lawyers took advantage of their position and betrayed the Imams and Shiites. This can be considered a crisis within an organization, economic and religious consequences of which were aimed at the Shiite community of that day.

3.11. *Some Embezzling Lawyers and False Claimants*

A) Arwa bin Yahya, known as Dehghan, was one of the lawyers of Imam Askari (PBUH) in Baghdad. Imam Askari (PBUH) appointed him as a trustworthy lawyer and an agent for receiving property. He was responsible for the property of Imam Askari (PBUH), but after a while he deviated and gave false ratios to Imam Hadi and Askari (PBUH). He seized part of the Imam's (PBUH) property and burned the rest of them (Kashi, n.d.).

B) Fars Ibn Hatem Qazvini was one of the lawyers of Imam Hadi (PBUH) in Samarra. Since he was originally from Qazvin, the Shiites of Qazvin paid their religious dues to him, but after a while he deviated and took possession of the Imam's property (Kashi, n.d.).

C) Abu Abdullah Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Sayari, in the time of Imam Javad (PBUH) claimed to be his lawyer, but Imam (PBUH) forbade Shiites from paying him (Kashi, n.d.).

D) Hassan Ibn Muhammad Ibn Baba Al-Qomi was one of the Ghalyans of the time of Imam Askari (PBUH). Imam Askari (PBUH) said about Ibn Baba and Muhammad ibn Nasir Fahri that we have already said about him and his beliefs: These two intended to profit from the people through us and they are insidious and seditious people. ... Ibn Baba thinks that I sent him as a prophet ... (Kashi n.d.).

3.12. *Tolerance of Shiites in Paying Sharia Funds*

Sometimes other groups intended to prevent property from reaching him, for example, Ibrahim Rassi, in writing his treatise, urged Shiites to pay money to the Imam. In the time of Imam Javad (PBUH), some Shiites did not pay much attention to the payment of religious funds (Tusi, 1985) or during the time of Imam Askari in the Shiites of Neishabour did not pay the religious funds. A part of Imam Askari's (PBUH) letter to Ishaq Ibn Ismail Neyshabouri is as follows: ... You did bad deeds during the time of the previous Imam and in my time, which I am not happy about. ... the duties that God has bestowed on you with mercy and grace were not to meet your needs and you do not need them; rather, the issuance of His

commands is accompanied by mercy in order to separate the pure from the impure and test what you have in your heart, and make it pure ... (Harrani, 1984).

The reason for the non-payment is not clear, but there are a number of reasons for this: Shiite skeptics have been barred from paying their dues by casting doubt on their Imamate or tempting Shiites to need property. On the other hand, the political constraints created by the Abbasid government had given the Shiites the opportunity to cast doubt on their suspicions, or the suspicion had been raised by lawyers competing with each other.

There was another case in the time of his Imamate, which was caused by differences in theological issues, so that some of them excommunicated others and for this reason they refused to pay the religious funds; Ayub Ibn Nab, who represented the people on his behalf. Fazl ibn Shazan from Neyshabur was appointed to accompany those who tended to exaggerate and delegate; therefore, Fazl ibn Shazan Neyshabouri and some other Shiites refused to pay him money and called on others to do the same (Kashi. n.d.).

4. Crisis Management by Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH)

Crisis management is a systematic process in which activities include: anticipating factors leading to a crisis, trying to prevent a crisis, planning and preparing to deal with it, searching for and applying appropriate solutions to resolve crisis situations, and finally return the condition to normal. Accordingly, crisis management in a general division is divided into three basic stages: "before the crisis"; "during the crisis"; "after the crisis."

Following the above three steps, the overall goal of crisis management, which is to optimize crisis management activities, reduce losses, limit and control the negative effects of it, is achieved (Coster & Norton, 2004) and the goal is to find a reasonable way to Elimination of abnormal conditions is provided by providing and maintaining fundamental interests and values (Abdolhamidzadeh, 2011).

4.1. Management of Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) Before the Crisis

At this stage, crisis prediction and prevention, which is the first cycle of crisis management, occurs. Almost all crises can be predicted and prevented (Mitraf & Engnas, 2002). Managing the necessary activities and measures to deal with the crisis is beyond the reach of one person and requires skilled and experienced people. Therefore, it is necessary to form a crisis management team (Reid, 2000). By studying the hadiths and manners of Ibna al-Reza (PBUH), it is understood that in his opinion, the way out of critical situations is possible by worshiping and trusting in God Almighty; in this regard, we can point to some cases; For example, Imam Javad (PBUH) said: If the way of the heavens and the earth is closed to a person, but the piety of God is practiced, God will open for them (Klini, 1987) or Imam Hadi (PBUH) stated the condition of answering prayers in hardships is considered to be relying only on God and asking only Him to answer (Majlisi, 1989). Of course, this does not mean that Imams (PBUH) expect to get out of this situation without any activity, but by using the principles of management, they try to prevent their occurrence and, if created, by making decisions. By on-time decisions, they would deal with it. Some of the most important measures taken by Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) in the pre-crisis stage are described below.

4.1.1. Strengthening the Spiritual Dimension

As stated, seeking God's help to get out of critical situations has a key role to play in the life of Ibna al-Reza (PBUH); therefore, in order to use it, it is necessary to create the ground and create this

capability in oneself. The prayers offered by Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) at all times of the day and night indicate that he is in constant contact with God and that he is ready. As an example, prayers have been narrated from Imam Hadi (PBUH), including after the evening prayer (Majlisi, 1989) during sleep or waking up (Majlisi, 1989), in Midnight (Majlisi, 1989), in the Qanoot of Prayer (Hali, 1991), after the morning prayer (Majlisi, 1989) and finally the prayer that according to him is they read many times (Majlisi, 1989). It is on the basis of this approach that a prayer has been recited by him to get rid of hardships: "O you who honor every humiliated person and humiliate every dear! Swear by you to your honor and glory, my patience is over, so send greetings to Muhammad and the family of Muhammad and relieve my suffering and sorrow" (Tusi, 1991). In addition to communicating with God, Ibna al-Reza (PBUH), by mentioning hadiths, encouraged others to strengthen the spiritual dimension, including Imam Javad (PBUH): Whoever turns to other than God, He leaves it to him (Majlisi, 1989) or Imam Askari (PBUH) said: Piousness and benevolence cause people to praise people and overcome enemies and keep a good name from any defect (Majlisi, 1989).

4.1.2. Utilizing Human Resources as a Crisis Management Team

In order to strengthen the Shiite community economically, Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) was in contact with the Shiites through members of the Bar Association. On the other hand, in order to solve the economic problems of the Shiites, influencing the body of the government was also on their agenda, which we will discuss below.

4.1.3. Law Firm

The terrifying and suffocating atmosphere of the Abbasid government, the vastness of the geographical area of the Shiite areas (Jabbari, 2003) had disturbed the communication between the Shiites and the Imams, and the Imams (PBUH) through formation in addition to solving these problems, the Bar Association saved the lives of Shiites from the dangers ahead. In this way, direct communication was reduced and intermediate communication replaced it. "Overall, lawyers worked in five areas: Iraq, including Baghdad, Madain, Savad, Samarra, Mosul, Basra, Nasib and Kufa. The Arabian Peninsula region includes Hejaz, Yemen and Bahrain. The western region of Iran, including Qom, Hamedan, Rey, Qazvin, Aveh (Abe), Dinur, Qarmisin and Azerbaijan. The eastern region of Iran, including Beyhaq (Sabzevar), Neishabour, Marv, Balkh, Kabul, Samarkand, Kash and Bukhara. North Africa, including Egypt and the Maghreb (Jabbari, 2003). The members of the organization were also scattered throughout the Shiite community. In this way, the lawyers settled in the Shiite cities. Senior lawyers have also been deployed in the five districts to provide services to Shiites and monitor the work of lawyers in their area. Lawyers were also stationed near the center of the organization. The center of the organization was a city inhabited by the Imams. Mobile lawyers were also on the move between the members' residence and Imam (PBUH) (Jabbari, 2003).

4.1.4. Influential Forces in the Government

One of the actions of the Imams (PBUH) in supporting the Shiites was to infiltrate the body of government in order to protect their friends from the oppression of the oppressors and to organize the affairs of the Muslims. They were sheltering the believers, relieving the needs of the believers who were poor against the oppressors, in the unforeseen events.

People like Hussein Ibn Abdullah Neyshabouri, the ruler of Bast and Sistan (Majlisi, 1989), Hakim Ibn Al-Asba Asadi, ruler of Bahrain (Tusi, 1985), Abu Yusuf Yaqub Ibn Bazid Ibn Hamad Anbari Salmi from Writers of the court of Montaser, who was one of the companions of the Imams (PBUH) (Najashi, 1996). Ishaq ibn Ibrahim, the ruler of Samarra and Sirvan in Jabal province (Hussein, 1998) and Mohammad Ibn Faraj, the agent of Egypt (Yaqubi, 2010) also played a role in the government

during the time of Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) to serve the Shiites. This practice also existed during the time of the previous Imams, such as Muhammad ibn Isma'il ibn Bazia (Najashi, 1996) and Ali ibn Yaqtan, who was the minister of Harun (Kashi, n.d.). Sometimes, Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) have used their internal knowledge to attract people from the enemy army to use them when needed. The Imams (PBUH) used to communicate with the person in question in cases where they saw fit to do so, and he would be attracted to them. As an example, Imam Hadi (PBUH) in Medina, using internal knowledge called *Baghai Kabir* (commander of the Abbasid army) by a name that he was being called by that during his childhood in his homeland, and no one was aware of it. In this way, he became aware of his position and became fascinated with Imam (PBUH) (Tabarsi, 1997).

The Abbasid caliphs did not pay the share of the Imams (PBUH) to the government so as not to legitimize their Imamate; As a result, they took action. On the other hand, the small growth of the Shiite population and their dispersal in the Islamic realm, prompted Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) to think of measures to meet the economic needs of the needy, which will be discussed.

4.1.5. Strengthening the Culture of Work and Effort

In Islamic teachings, work and effort have been introduced and emphasized as *jihad* for the sake of God (Tusi, 1985). In the conditions of economic sanctions, guiding the people of the society to work and trying and using talents can be effective in reducing the pressures; therefore, Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) (PBUH) with practical action in this field, played a role in promoting and strengthening work culture and preparing for productivity. They provided the conditions for sanctions. Imam Javad (PBUH) (Qutb Ravandi, 1989) and Imam Hadi (PBUH) (Mofid, 1923) with agriculture and living in Saria (Majlisi, 1989), in addition to the construction of that place, a step In order to improve the living conditions of the Shiites was taken. An example is Imam Hadi's (PBUH) working in agriculture, so that sweat flowed from his head and face. This and the absence of workers surprised Ali ibn Hamza. Imam Khomeini (PBUH) stated that agriculture is one of the works of the prophets, their successors and worthy servants of God, and cited the example of the Prophet (PBUH), Amir al-Mu'minin and other ancestors to provide livelihood as the reason for this action (Majlisi, 1989).

4.1.6. Collecting Religious Funds

With the help of the members of the organization, Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) were able to collect the religious funds and related financial rights from all over the Islamic country. By sending letters to the Shiites of the world, he obliged them to pay the money, and in a letter, he mentioned the names of the fundraising officers. For example, Imam Askari (PBUH) wrote in a letter to Ishaq ibn Ismail: All my friends there (Neishabour) must pay financial salaries to Ibrahim ibn Abduh Neishaburi (Kashi, n.d.).

4.1.7. Ensuring the Sent Letters

In order for the Shiites to hand over their sharia funds to the members of the organization with confidence, and on the other hand, due to the lack of trust in the members, to pay attention to the payment of funds, Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) devised measures to prevent any excuses. They will be mentioned in the following sections.

4.1.8. Introduction and Authentication of Members

After electing the members, Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) sent those letters, introduced them and confirmed them. For example, Imam Hadi (PBUH) wrote to the Shiites of Baghdad: I chose Abu Ali ibn Rashid ... to receive the religious funds. He is a good person to manage your affairs. May God have mercy on you, hand over the funds to him ... (Kashi, n.d.) or in a letter to Abdullah bin Hamdawayah, they wrote

in vain: I have appointed Ibrahim bin Abduh to receive the religious funds of your region. And I made him my trusted and trustworthy lawyer with my followers (Kashi, n.d.).

4.1.9. Making His Handwriting Identified

The Shiites have been implicitly acquainted with the handwriting of Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) in some hadiths, and for this reason, they trusted his writings, so it can be said that this was done in the early days of his Imamate. It has become possible for the Shiite community to communicate in writing, to accept orders and statements. Ahmad ibn Ishaq says in this regard: I visited Imam Askari (PBUH) and asked him to write a few lines so that I could know his handwriting. He said: O Ahmad! Writing is different based on the width of the writing instrument; this point should not cause you to doubt my handwriting. Then he asked for ink and wrote (Klini, 1997) or Ahmad ibn Hussein Qomi says: When the child of Imam Askari (PBUH) was born, a letter was received from him to my grandfather Ahmad ibn Ishaq, in which was written in the handwriting of Imam (PBUH) himself, whose letters were in that handwriting (Ibn Babawiyah, 1995).

4.1.10. Monitoring Fundraising

As the leader of the organization, Imam (PBUH) should monitor the activities of his subordinates, monitor their work quality, health, or deviation, so that he can make appropriate decisions and implement them if necessary. These monitoring was carried out through several channels: monitoring of lawyers, lawyer of lawyers, some properties, and mobile lawyers and based on the knowledge of the unseen of the Imam (PBUH). For example, Imam Askari (PBUH) in a letter to Ishaq ibn Ismail - the great person in Neyshabur - made him the master of the deeds of Ibrahim ibn Abduh to perform his duties (Kashi, n.d.).

4.2. Management of Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) During the Crisis

The crisis stage is when managers must respond to the crisis (Combs, 2007). The best strategy to prevent the growth of a potential crisis is to control it, because not controlling the crisis in the early stages of formation leads to its development, which makes it impossible to control (Gates, 2004). The following can be considered as the actions of the late Imams in crisis management:

4.2.1. Strengthening Economic Strength

Despite the hardships of the Abbasid government and the pressure on the Shiites in the economic sanctions of the Imams, especially since the time of Mutawakkil, Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) was able to provide the necessary funds for the Shiite community in various ways, and in doing so. They were successful when they said: Imam al-Hadi's (PBUH) almsgiving was so great that no one but the kings could pay it, and this amount of forgiveness has not been seen by anyone until then (Ibn Shahr Ashob, 1997). It should be noted that most of these sums were provided by the Shiites, as they have said: Ahmad ibn Ishaq presented them with one hundred and sixty gold and silver bags that he had received from the Shiites of Qom (Tabarsi, 1997) Or a person from Jabal presented the amount of four thousand Dinars to Imam Askari (PBUH) (Arbali, 1985). Apart from the Shiites, other sources of this money were collected, which would be discussed below.

4.2.2. Rule

Although the Abbasid caliphs tried to narrow the economic sphere to Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) and the Shiites, but thanks to God, from time to time, situations were created under the influence of which the caliphs paid large sums in the form of gifts (Yaqubi, 2010), vows (Koleini, 1987) or cash donations were offered to him. In addition, the infiltrating forces in the elements of the government in the form of khums

provided funds to Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) or his lawyers. For example, in the last few years of the Imamate of Imam Javad (PBUH), some government troops were Shiites who joined the government forces to fight Babak and paid khums on booty (Tusi, 1984). Some rulers, such as Hussein ibn Abdullah Neyshabouri, the ruler of Bast (Majlisi, 1989), sent the ruling of Bin Alba Asadi, the ruler of Bahrain, secretly to Imam Javad (PBUH) Khums (Tusi, 1985). At the same time, Hakim Bast supported the Shiites of the region and took care of their financial affairs (Tusi, 1985).

4.2.3. *Shiites*

Another way to finance the economic budget of Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) was to pay the religious funds of the Shiites. Although the Shiites were in dire straits at this time due to the difficulties made by the caliphs, the Shiites of cities such as Neyshabur, Qom, etc., were in a better position, so that Mutawakkil was always afraid of sending funds from the Qom dwellers. Another example is the payment of funds from the people of Jorjan to Imam Askari (PBUH) (Qutb Ravandi, 1989).

4.2.4. *Khums*

One of the Shari'a funds of the Shiites belongs to Khums, and Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) required the Shiites to pay it through the members of the Advocacy Organization who had gone to the Shiite areas to collect the funds. For example, Imam Askari (PBUH) wrote in a letter to the people of Neyshabour: I have appointed Ibrahim bin Abduh to receive the financial rights of your district ... pay the obligatory financial funds that no one is excused to leave paying or delay (Kashi, n.d.). Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) warned the Shiites when they saw the weakness in paying khums. For example, some Shiites of Neyshabour, during the time of Imam Askari (PBUH) in this regard, neglected that Imam (PBUH) reacted to it. While writing a letter to Ishaq Ibn Ismail, he complained about the Shiites (Harraniya, 1984). Sometimes, his complaint about non-payment was directed at the members of the organization. For example, when Imam Jawad (PBUH) sent his two mobile lawyers to Qom to collect religious funds, a dispute arose between them, so Zakaria ibn Adam refused to hand over the funds to the two. This caused the Imam (PBUH) to complain about Zakaria not sending money (Kashi, n.d.).

It should be noted that sometimes due to the bad economic conditions, Ibn al-Reza (PBUH) gave a discount to the Shiites in receiving khums. For example, Imam Javad (PBUH) wrote in the reply letter of Ali ibn Mahziar: Because the Sultan has oppressed you and the Shiites are under pressure, the khums that I made obligatory on them this year is only in gold and silver, which is one year. I have not made this obligatory on the goods, utensils, cattle, slaves, and profits obtained in trade and on the farm, except on the farm on which I will explain. This is a discount on my part for my Shiites, and it is a blessing that I have given them, because of the amounts that the ruler has taken from them (Tusi, 1985).

4.2.5. *Zakat*

Another financial support of Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) was zakat. For example, the delivery of Ismail Ibn Khattab's grains to Imam Javad (PBUH) (Kashi, n.d.) should be mentioned and some also asked Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) for a solution in this regard. Imam Hadi (PBUH) mentioned the nature of each city and how to estimate its amount and put an end to such disputes (Tusi, 1985).

4.2.6. *Endowments*

Another source of funding for Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) was endowments. For example, Ali ibn Mahziar reported the dedication of one-fifth of an individual's land to Imam Jawad (PBUH) (Har'amali, N.d.), and Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) had officials for his endowments in Shiite centers, including Saleh ibn

Muhammad. Ibn Sahl Qomi, overseer of the endowments of Qom, during the time of Imam Javad (PBUH) and Ahmad Ibn Ishaq Qomi, during the time of Imam Askari (PBUH) (Jabbari, 2003).

4.2.7. *Wills*

The Shiites bequeathed property to Ibna al-Reza (PBUH). For example, Ali ibn Mahziar informed Imam Hadi (PBUH) about the bequest of property of some Ahwaz residents (Tusi, 1985). Another proposition is the mission of selling the individual matrix by Muhammad ibn Abdus by Imam Askari (PBUH), who had given his property to him in his will (Tusi, 1985).

4.2.8. *Keramat*

As stated in the pre-crisis management section, Ibna al-Reza (PBUH), by strengthening his spiritual dimension, gained the necessary readiness to use it in crisis situations. One of the examples is when Ibn al-Reza (PBUH) was in financial difficulties, fulfilling the needs of the needy by performing miracles. Among them are the miracles that were performed on Abu Hashim Jafari and turned the soil into gold (Ibn Shahr Ashob, 1997).

Sometimes, in order to satisfy the needs of the Shiites, Ibn 'Reza (PBUH) invited them to communicate with God, and in this way, they met their needs. For example, Imam Askari (PBUH) in response to Abbas Naqid who complained about his need, said: saying noon and evening prayers right after call for prayer, eliminates poverty and misery (Klini, 2001).

4.2.9. *Farms*

Medina's economy was dependent on agriculture, and as stated, Imam Javad (PBUH) had a grove in Medina, and the custody of his property and possessions after their martyrdom was in the hands of Abdullah ibn Maswar until Imam Hadi (PBUH) grew up. (Koleini, 1987) and he was also engaged in the same profession (Majlisi, 1989).

4.2.10. *Gifts of other Religions*

Sometimes Christians gave gifts. For example, a gift from a Christian in Tartus to the servants of Khadem (Kashi, N.d.) or Yusuf Yaqub Nasrani, the scribe who donated one hundred Dinars for his health to Imam Hadi (PBUH) (Qutb Ravandi 1989).

4.2.11. *Distribution of Sharia Funds*

By meeting the economic needs of the Shiites, Ibn al-Reza (PBUH), while influencing the reduction of poverty and class gap in society, prevented the spiritual instability, the collapse of the family system or the attraction of governance for livelihood, to remain steadfast in following the Imams (PBUH). Sometimes, by sacrificing, they helped relatives and others on various occasions, such as Eid al-Adha or the children's Aaqeeqah (Majlisi, 1989). Although the Shari'a funds reached Ibn 'al-Reza (PBUH) after the collection, some of it remained with the lawyers to be used to strengthen the Shiites, help the poor, and improve the affairs of the Shiites. People like orphans and the needy (Mofid, 1923). As Imam Askari (PBUH) allowed Ibrahim ibn 'Abdu'l-Bah to seize the funds in accordance with goodness and expediency (Kashi, N.d.). Also, some funds were used to cover the expenses of the organization and its members (Majlisi, 1989) and to fight against corrupt and deviant elements, including paying for the purchase of weapons to kill Fars (Kashi, N.d.) and determining a fixed pension for his murderer (Koleini, 1987).

4.2.12. *Hiring People and Financial Advice*

By appointing members of the organization and paying them for their livelihoods (such as a five hundred dirham pension to Abu Amr al-Hudha), Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) created a kind of employment. Another example in this regard, or a person from Persia, goes to Imam Askari (PBUH) for service, he accepts him as his servant in the purchasing department (Kolini, 2001).

They also used their unseen knowledge to help Shiites in their financial affairs (choosing a business, its prosperity, etc.) so that they would not face financial difficulties. For example, Imam Askari (PBUH) prevented one of his companions from participating in the purchase and sale of fruit due to the locust pest (Majlisi, 1989). Another one asked how to get usury-free profit (Majlisi, 1989).

4.2.13. *Observance of Protection Affairs When Collecting Funds*

The strict control of Ibna al-Reza (PBUH), especially Imam Askariin (PBUH), required them to take measures to receive funds so that they would not fall into the hands of government officials (Tusi, 1985). He instructed his deputies to keep their actions secret. Sometimes, due to the negligence of some of them, the news of receiving funds was revealed, but before the agents could take any action in this regard, the Imam, with his knowledge of the unseen, became aware of the matter and discovered the funds. Preventions were carried out, such as intrusive inspections by government officials of the house of Imam Hadi (PBUH), which, for this reason, failed. Sometimes, before the funds reached the hands of Ibna al-Reza (PBUH), due to the negligence of the deputies, the news of the transfer by the government spies reached the caliph. For example, the news of the transfer of property from Qom to Imam Hadi (PBUH) reached Mutawakel. He made Fatah ibn Khaqan responsible for it. Fatah also spoke about this with the influential force of the Imam (PBUH) in the government, named Abu Musa. Abu Musa informed Imam (PBUH) about the revelation of the news, but he was aware of it with his foreknowledge. Imam (PBUH) kept Abu Musa with them and using his foreknowledge from the exact time of the arrival of the property, in the middle of the night, when the property reached the door of the house, they asked Abu Musa to prevent the servant appointed by the government from entering the House (Tusi, 1994). Thus, with his measures, the government officials failed in their plan.

4.2.14. *Economic Sanctions against Deviants and Dealing with Economic Corrupters*

According to the order of Imam Hadi (PBUH), some deviants, including those who believe in the physicality of God (Ibn Babawiyah, 1985) and also drinking wine (Sharb al-Khumr), even though they are Shiites (Kolini, 2001), were deprived of receiving zakat.

Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) dealt with abusers of the position of lawyer, whether they were members of the organization or those who attributed themselves to the organization.

4.2.15. *Embezzling Lawyers*

Occasionally, members of the organization used the funds they had raised. Ibn al-Reza's (PBUH) attitude towards them was different. Some used to seek the opinion of Imam (PBUH) before using him, in which case he would agree with him. Like the question that Ali ibn Mahziar asked about this (Kashi, N.d.). After using it, some people informed him, such as Abdul Aziz bin Mohtadi Qomi Ash'ari and Imam (PBUH) with the knowledge they had of him, and asked for his forgiveness (Kashi, N.d.); Sahl, who was in charge of endowments in Qom, sought solicitation after using endowment property. Although the Imam (PBUH) made him lawful, but due to the violation of the rights and property of the family of Muhammad (pbuh), orphans, the needy, the poor and Ibna al-Sabil were considered among the people who will be severely rebuked by God (Mofid, 1990). It is possible that their solvency was done for the

purpose of taqiyyah from righteous behavior, or that they only forgave their right, not the right of God or the right of Sadat. Others, such as Arwa ibn Yahya Nakhas Dehghan and Fars ibn Hatim, were dealt with more severely because of their open enmity with Ibna al-Reza (PBUH). After their dismissal and cursing, Ara was cursed by Imam Askari (PBUH) and then died. Receipt (Kashi, N.d.) and Fars was killed by the order to kill Imam Hadi (PBUH) (Kashi, N.d.).

4.2.16. Dealing with Claimants of Lawyering

As it turned out, some people, for economic and worldly reasons, claimed to be lawyers in order to raise the religious funds of the Shiites. Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) also dealt with these people in accordance with their evil and goals. With some, including the planetary, they only denied him (Kashi, N.d.). With some such as Ibn Nasir, his rejection and curse was enough (Kashi, N.d.) and with some such as Ibn Baba Qomi, they ordered to break their heads (Kashi, N.d.). These reactions increased the insight of the Shiites and they refused to hand over the property to them.

4.2.17. Economic-Educational Recommendations

Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH), while giving educational speeches on economic issues, while advising to endure the existing economic difficulties, pointed out some factors that increase and decrease the daily allowance. On the other hand, by giving motivational speeches, they encouraged wealthy people to donate and warned against extravagance, some of which we will be mentioned.

4.2.18. Strengthening the Spirit of Tolerance and Stability

Due to the difficult economic conditions of that day, Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) raised the Shiites by expressing educational speeches, about contentment, patience, paying attention to other blessings of God, and hopeful statements, raising the tolerance of low-income people, including Imam Hadi's order. (PBUH) to Abu Hashim Jafari, when he was in economic trouble. He informed him of the divine blessings (faith, forgiveness and contentment) that had been bestowed upon him, and noted his inability to give thanks (Ibn al-Babawiyah, 1976). Imam Askari (PBUH) also considered the need that led the believer to humiliation to be ugly (Harraniya, 1984). Imam Javad (PBUH) also considered divine piety as the cause of opening, although there seems to be no way for it (Klini, 2001).

Observing his practical manners was also effective in strengthening the spirit of tolerance of the Shiites, because although they received property from near and far, they had a very simple and ascetic life, for example, Yahya ibn Harthama, in his report. To Mutawakel, he described the furniture of the Imam's (PBUH) house as a few pieces of mat on which they pray and mentioned the Quran and the book (Majlisi, 1989).

4.2.19. Avoiding Extravagance

Although Ibn al-Reza (PBUH) ordered beautification and warned Shiites against pretending to be poor (Tusi, 1994), they were also opposed to the false culture of extravagance. The Qur'anic injunctions in this regard, as well as the unfavorable economic conditions of the time, required him to mention this in his advice. As Muhammad ibn Hamzah Sarwari was advised to be moderate and to avoid extravagance and considered it as evil behavior (Majlisi, 1989). He has forbidden it even in obligatory and recommended matters, such as excessive consumption of water (ablution and ghusl), which he considered to be invalid (Harrani, 1984).

4.2.20. Introducing the Factors of Increasing and Decreasing the Ailment

Since God is the owner of sustenance and the sustenance of the people is in His hands (Dhariyat/58 and Hood/6), Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) tried to introduce the factors that are effective in reducing and increasing the sustenance due to the economic situation of this time. For example, disobedience of parents was considered to be the cause of poverty (Majlisi, 1989) and the blessing of blessings was considered to be the cause of its increase (Majlisi, 1989).

Another factor in increasing the day of almsgiving is that Ibn 'al-Reza (PBUH) tried to encourage Shiites to do this God-pleasing act by uttering motivational hadiths. For example, Imam Hadi (PBUH) quotes Imam Ali (PBUH) as saying: whoever has certainty, will not refuse forgiveness in any way (Hor Ameli, n.d.) and in his speech they refer to the effects of almsgiving in order to encourage the Shiites to disintegrate as well, such as the greatest honor in the sight of God. 1989), Shiites were warned against it.

5. Management of Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH) after the Crisis

This stage includes all actions and activities that are performed after the crisis. Identification of the causes of the crisis is also done at this stage to be used in future crises and with the information obtained during the crisis management process, to find a way to increase readiness for future crises (Combs, 2007). Since the power was in the hands of the Abbasid government throughout the Imamate of Ibna al-Reza (PBUH), there were still economic sanctions and the crisis was not completely eliminated, but his actions in making the crisis more effective could include Post-crisis solutions. For example, the expansion of the organization, the publication of educational-economic hadiths, as well as motivational hadiths in the field of charity.

Conclusion

Shiites lived in politically-economically unfavorable conditions during the first six decades of the third century AH, although this situation sometimes improved, such as in the time of Wathiq and Montaser, and sometimes in the time of Ma'mun and Mu'tasim, but in the time of Mutawakel. The reason for the long period of the caliphate, as well as the caliphs after Montaser, was the living conditions of the critical Shiites. During this period, the late Shiite imams were able to deal with this crisis and reduce its effects by designing various models and taking measures and solutions. In the first place, crisis preparedness and prevention was a priority. Efforts to enlighten and inform the masses of the people with the aim of preventing the occurrence of a crisis or mitigating the effects in the event of an outbreak have been the next step. But what distinguishes his management style is his adherence to religious principles and the strengthening of the spiritual dimension. Ibna al-Reza (PBUH) considered the passage of critical conditions to depend on the help of God, therefore, before the crisis; they strengthened their spiritual dimension and that of others. In addition, by hiring auxiliary forces such as the intellectual and religious elites and the influential forces in the government tried to prevent the crisis and tried to prevent the crisis by strengthening the work culture and collecting religious funds from the rich, but due to the power and wealth of the government, its occurrence was natural. Therefore, the Imams (PBUH) used taqiyyah and protective principles during the crisis and took measures such as strengthening economic power, distributing religious funds among the needy, advising Shiites on financial affairs, dealing with economic corrupters and banning deviants and economic advice. In order to improve the living conditions of the Shiites, they faced a crisis. Since the Imamate of the Abbasid government continued throughout the Imamate, the crisis did not completely disappear, but its effects were reduced under the management of Ibna Al-Reza (PBUH). On the other hand, his actions in the face of the crisis were such that in the following eras, it can be used to prevent its recurrence.

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