



Tağnīs al-Multaqaṭ as a Source for Studying the Transition Period of Hanafism in Central Asia

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Abstract

Freedom, civil society legalism, pluralism, useful, constructive and healthy competition in society, political participation, elections, a comprehensive constitution, and the growth of non-governmental organizations, fundamental freedoms and the provision of civil and political rights are the most important components of political development are. People in society and the establishment of a parliamentary system. New movements are also mainly social and cultural in nature and emerged with the aim of reviving identity, deepening and developing political participation in Islamic and Arab societies. Some affiliated Arab regimes, such as the government of Al-Saud and the military regime of al-Sisi in Egypt, consider democracy to be a great and serious threat to the survival of their regime. Findings show that political culture, diplomatic support and guarantees, economic aid and foreign intervention are important obstacles to political development in the Arab world, and Arab regimes deliberately and sometimes inadvertently engineer polarization methods in society to prevent this. By the way, their authoritarian methods seem to be the last obstacle to the total collapse of their countries. Such conditions are certainly crucial to the survival of the Arab world governments and the Arab coup military regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. The method used in this research is qualitative (descriptive-analytical) and the method of collecting information is the use of library resources.

Keywords: *Political Culture; Political Theories; Saudi Arabia; Democracy*

Problem Statement

When despotic Arab regimes despair of staying in power, they try to cultivate tribal and sectarian allegiances and pit one group against another. The Arab authoritarian rulers, by posing as arbitrators of these fictitious conflicts and polarized groups, manage a secret civil war that continues through peaceful means, and these groups and conflicts are judged by the authoritarian ruler, who relies on this. A fictitious threat constantly extorts money from the people of his community. Like a terrorist carrying a suicide belt, an authoritarian Arab authoritarian ruler pretends to his people that if he leaves, the whole house and country will burn and explode. The level of governance of a government depends on its ability to transform citizens and turn them into actors and shareholders in the main organs and components of the political body and political institution. To understand the authoritarian nature of politics in Arab countries, it is necessary to consider the cause of oil and the types of conflicts and their negative effects and the historical and political

contexts of the Persian Gulf countries, because it gives us good insight and helps. Explain the survival and continuation of authoritarianism and the failure of democracy in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. It is difficult for researchers to predict the course of events in the Arab world. The hallmark of most Arab governments can be seen in information censorship, a strong filtering system, and strict oversight of the non-governmental media, as well as the relative distrust of those in power in the state media and the growing enthusiasm. They pointed out in obtaining information from non-governmental sources.

We quote the headlines of some articles in Arab newspapers in years 1 and 4 that express the will and aspirations of the Arab nations in those days: These revolutions are for democracy. Terrorism and sectarian violence run counter to democracy and rationality. We want freedom and justice together. The Arab Democratic Government is the government of all people. Justice is not possible without the rule of law. The people include all Arab and non-Arab citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims. The opposition must adhere to democratic principles. The balance between freedom and justice is based on civil rights and political and social rights. The will of the nations is the independence of forces and free elections. "We have come to defend democracy, not to seek political office." (Sobhani, 2011: 1).

There are many current changes in the Islamic world and the Middle East. The results of the Islamic Awakening and the changing nature of the Middle East have made it difficult to predict the future of the Middle East. In addition, the international realities and the enormous economic and strategic changes that are taking place have created many difficulties. The Islamic Awakening is the only justification for the beginning of change and it improves over time and not only leads to the change of the Arab regimes but also changes the perceptions of oneself and others and creates a common consciousness or consciousness. The Islamic or Arab awakening gave the people hope that it would free them from the conditions of humiliation and depravity and liberate the social and political imaginations, which are often focused on the people and their hopes and not on the centers of power and individual interests. Luckily, the spring began in Tunisia, a society of ethnic and sectarian homogeneity, characterized by high standards of higher education and high levels of literacy, civic or internal sentiment, and political awareness. كورد. The Tunisian revolution provided a beautiful model that revived hopes in the Arab world that had long been buried under pillars of repression, depression and pessimism. The transition process has continued in the Arab world, such as Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Egypt, while party rivalries have intensified due to weak democratic and participatory culture, lack of political experience, and lack of social rules on political action and leadership. Among the various parties, some crises and disturbances occur. At the same time, different political currents and trends will try to revive and institutionalize their existence and outrun their rivals by any means possible. But after a while, they realize that the basis of democratic politics is to work and cooperate with each other, and this requires limiting the fantasies or political tendencies for guerrilla and fanatical purposes and labeling the other evil. The powers that be support the revolution and change in the Middle East try to organize the transition process in a way that is consistent with their interests and orientations. The United States, Western powers, and some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are trying to establish a secular, pro-Israel regime in Syria. A regime that is far from the Islamic Awakening and Islamic movements should not be hostile to Israel and should be aligned with the West. Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates want a political transition in Syria similar to the experiences of Tunisia and Egypt. The situation in Egypt, the West and the United States is at odds with the democratic ideals they claim to be pursuing. They claimed that they were opposed to any military intervention in the democratic process, but they did not intervene in the military intervention in Egypt and the removal of the Egyptian democratic government (Morsi government) and supported the coup government. The government of Morsi) was supported by many countries in the West and Saudi Arabia instead of being condemned (sufiyan, 2014, 109).

The question we seek to answer here is what the role of political culture is, foreign interference and elites in the failure to achieve political development and democracy in the Arab world. The research method used in this research is qualitative and the library and documentary study method has been used to collect information.

Theoretical Framework of Research

Political development is a controversial concept in the theoretical field and perhaps out of reach in the field of social cause. Going through periods of political development and establishing a developed political society in any country requires a difficult and risky transition through a period of political transition that, if extended too long, increases the likelihood of going backwards. Achieving political development means a process in which authoritarian political and conservative regimes give way to systems based on popular vote, political parties, representation, and civic bureaucracies that require public awareness and movement on the one hand, and the acceptance and will of the rulers on the other. It is on the other side (Azghandi, 2013: 27).

Political development means the institutionalization of politics. This development comes at a time when institutions are being created for the new variations and complexities that have arisen as a result of modernization that lead to cohesion and cohesion within the political community. Thus the discussion of development is equivalent to the discussion of Durkheim's collective conscience. Political development, in fact, cures the dimension of social change, while modernization causes social ills. The relationship between the concepts of anomie modernization on the one hand and the development of stability on the other hand is shown in the following curve (Seifzadeh, 1989: 173).

Political development, due to its multidimensional, comprehensive and highly qualitative nature, is the most complex level of development of a society. Ronald Chiklott believes that theories of political development can be divided into three parts:

- 1) Those who equate political development with democracy
- 2) Those who have focused on research on political change and development
- 3) Those who have analyzed crises and sequential stages of political development.

Binder believes that if a country wants to grow and develop, it must go through five crises. These five crises are: Identity crisis, Ravtication crisis, Renetvation crisis, Legitimavy crisis, and Distribution crisis. He believes that the distinguishing feature of industrialized countries from developing countries It is development that in the past they have successfully overcome the above crises, especially the crises of identity and legitimacy (Seifzadeh, 1989: 173).

Huntington evaluates the concept of political development in terms of the degree of industrialization, social mobilization, economic growth, and political participation, and believes that as new demands emerge in the process of political development in the form of participation and newer roles. Therefore, the political system must have the necessary capacity and ability to change the situation, otherwise the system will face instability, chaos, authoritarianism and political decline, and society's response to these disorders may manifest itself in the form of revolution. Huntington ultimately sees political modernization as a movement to rationalize the power of differentiation of structures and to expand political commonality. Another approach focuses on the political culture of the elites and the intellectual and ideological current of society. The Islamic Revolution of Iran had a great impact on the elites, people, Arab governments and the strategy of the great powers in the Middle East. Liberal, socialist and nationalist in the Arab world, these countries do not have a good trend for political development, and the Middle Eastern countries have never faced sustainable political development. Political development is directly related to culture and power. John Foran and Goldstone's theory focuses on widespread discontent, the alliance of classes and social forces, widespread corruption of rulers, the reaction of foreign actors, political culture and economic stagnation. We pay different.

The Approach of Political Culture, Elite Agency and Political Structure

Syed Jamal al-Din, in his discussion of the Awakening 150 years ago, considers the following eight axes and points as the foundations of the Islamic Awakening: emphasizing the need to fight against the tyranny and dictatorship of colonialism, the need to get acquainted with new sciences and technologies and

to be equipped with They. Return to the original Islam and pure Islam without heresy and return to the Qur'an. Faith and belief in the school of Islam as a school that has the necessary and sufficient ability to save Muslims and liberate them. The need to fight against foreign colonialism, the need for unity of the Islamic world, the need to return the spirit of struggle and jihad to the Islamic society. Fighting self-defeat against the West) they play, but social contexts always lead to the formation of unstable structures (Ahmadi, 2011: 39). A society that is dominated by nature and instinct is irrational in nature. They know that the natural is within the framework of instinctual and predetermined structures that which is based on spiritual issues as well as belief systems are analyzed within the framework of the natural (Solomon, 1983: 223) Political structure set of institutions, centers and laws It is related to political power, which forms a single whole. The basic coordinates of these countries in the post-independence period are Mill Extensive denationalization of the state structure, the creation of broad and long security networks, and more severe repression of political and civil liberties, and the elimination of political parties and democratic organizations. The scope of these repressions in some respects was even more violent and beyond the colonial era. That is, those things that were tolerated in the colonial period for certain reasons and to a certain extent, faced more serious repression in the post-independence period. If we consider the political structure as the hardware of the political system, the political culture is its software. Democracy means that everything is formed within and through social interaction (Pouzi, 2000: 164). (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Huntington's polarization model (Mitra, 2006, 16).

Dialectical debates among scholars of Arab issues have focused more on economic and political aspects, and sometimes addressing cultural reasons in the transition to democratic processes has been taken for granted; But it seems that the deliberate omission of existing cultural and social realities by some and the imperfect allusions of others is due to the existence of nationalist tendencies on the one hand and the lack of in-depth cultural research on the other. However, the existence of cultural realities involved in the democratization practices of these societies has been emphasized by a small group of scholars; Giacomo Luciani, for example, points out that the Arab world is an exception in the international arena, which is characterized by multiple democratic processes. Although one or more Arab countries have been on the verge of democracy at different times, none of them has been in such danger. It is not a constructive view, and in social analysis, and especially when it comes to behavioral phenomena, different layers of political culture must be combined to arrive at a clearer understanding of an idea. In his views, Lukcs or Lucas paid attention to the micro and tangible realities of society and believed that in order to understand the basic realities and essence of the social behavior of society and the nation, one cannot ignore the general and repetitive patterns in political behavior; Because the inherent realities of society, which are always the result of mutual play and constant conflict between the whole and the part, are repeated in the history of human life and establish an inseparable process of social life (Lucas, 2004, 117).

Many Middle Eastern scholars believe that one of the factors influencing the promotion of democracy in the Middle East is the cultural barriers rooted in the region's ethnic, national, and institutionalized beliefs. Brian Cleavesmith believes there is ample convincing evidence that a low-level political culture can undermine democracy, and sees the lack of commitment of African and Latin American political elites to democratic principles as a serious problem that has led to a lack of democratic values in the region. Has been. (Clive Smith, 2005: 502). The view that "there is a competence in an individual or a family to exercise sovereignty and power" is rooted in deep social beliefs that still have significant followers, especially in the East and the Arab world. This attitude can, in the long run, set the pattern for social behavior in which "a man and an undisputed leader are worthy of government and obedience to all is necessary." Such an issue is partly related to what Nietzsche calls the "ethics of slavery" and which still

manifests itself in the political culture of different societies. The more the belief in following the "family-oriented" rulers grows, the weaker one's belief in one's ability to make the necessary changes. If people believe that individuals in a group are weak and powerless, belief in a "ruler" will increase. Evidence of this was the Arabs' belief in the role of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who believed that it would not only liberate Palestine but also bring social justice to all Arabs (Rodinson, 1972, 8-32).

The collapse of the structures that hold internal divisions together can lead to the collapse of those structures and the state, leading to social violence, civil war, and the creation of failed states. Liberating and liberating public opinion along with their interests and prejudices can lead an immature democracy to the arena of various wars, and other unfortunate foreign events in turn can lead this democracy to a range of unintended and undesirable consequences. There is no guarantee that governments or governments that are embarking on the path of democracy will be able to reach their destination or even reach a good place (Pollack, 2011, 1).

Subordinate and Conservative Political Culture

According to an agreement between Wahhabi scholars and the Saudi regime, Wahhabi Islamic law became the ruling law in Saudi Arabia, with personal responsibilities, punishment for criminals, and regulation of social behavior. Take on this task effectively. The mission includes discrimination, severe restrictions on the presence of women in public, the banning of alcohol and Western forms of entertainment, and the promotion of Wahhabi terrorist Islam. They also agreed that the Saudi government would establish a religious establishment in important political areas such as politics. Foreign affairs, modernization, economics, and most of the public spheres are ignored (Kechichian 1986). They consider the Arab state or the Arab ruler as a kind of apostasy from the taboos and demonstrations and rebellion against him, on the other hand, this current of thought considers it obligatory to be patient with the ruler or the state, albeit as an executor. Islamic law does not operate in accordance with Islamic law, on the basis of which it can be inferred that the current has a conservative ideological orientation, they have no worries other than the implementation of Wahhabi law in its individual form, and seek to bring about political reform. Their slogan is "I am the policy of leaving politics" and they emphasize the need to obey the ruler and result in the corruption of the rulers. Corruption People know. Qaradawi called them "Al-Tayyar Al-Zahiri". They sometimes speak of denying imitation and opening the door to *ijtihad*, and consider their mission to be the purification of the beliefs of Muslims, and have formed the largest front in opposition to Sufism and Shiism. Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Taqiyya al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah are known as the source of inspiration and their spiritual father, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab is the founder of the current political government in the Arabian Peninsula. The most common books in this group are the principles of Sunnah Ibn Hanbal, Al-Aqeedah Al-Tahawiyah, Al-Aqeedah Al-Wasitiyah and Minhaj Al-Sunnah Ibn Taymiyyah, the book Al-Tawhid wa Kashf Al-Shabhat Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The school's largest representative is the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia, which, during a period of unstable political power such as the Taliban government in Afghanistan, ISIS and the Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq, has succeeded in developing such perceptions of Salafism in some parts of the world. Took. (Judaki, Boroumand Alam, Zuhair, 2013: 15). From the point of view of the supporters of this approach, the political culture of the ruling elites in the Arab world is the main factor in weakening the ruling identity in the Arab countries and the future development of power relations in those two countries. In their view, it seems that the political culture of the ruling elites in the period before the political-security crisis in the Arab countries was a subordinate political culture. This type of political culture is specific to traditional systems such as patriarchy, oligarchy, monarchy and bureaucracy. Influenced by the subordinate culture of the Arab world, the political behavior of individuals is a combination of opportunism, passivity, withdrawal, covert protest and fear. Accordingly, the ruling groups that grow up in this cultural space are generally opportunistic, flattering, chakra-minded, servile, authoritarian, and authoritarian, and have a favorable view of expanding participation, competition, and the development of effective political institutions. They do not show themselves. In the political arena as well, the elites, due to the feeling of fear and psychological insecurity, try to gain the consent of the ruler in any way possible and get closer to his privacy. As a result, the atmosphere of opportunism and flattery expands, and meritocracy gives way to devotion. In such a situation, the political elites had to focus on the thoughts, inclinations, and policies of the first person in government in order to gain positions or remain in

office. Since in such an atmosphere, elites with personality and voting independence could not survive, the conditions were created for the emergence of purely obedient elites. In this way, a flood of flattering speeches and behaviors flowed towards the rulers of the Arab world, and the consequences of these things showed in the form of a disease in their political system. A disease that the social fabric could not tolerate, therefore, violent protests gradually began (Steinbach, 2014: 3). The constant challenges of national identity in Arab countries (which is precisely influenced by the behavioral patterns and political culture of society) are historical phenomena and a combination of objective characteristics of culture, social organization, race, mental characteristics, ethnic claims, and behavioral and psychological themes. Such challenges, reflected in religious, ethnic, linguistic, and tribal behaviors, are considered an important factor in shaping the region's political culture (Brown, 1984, 143). Understanding and analyzing ethnic and national identities in the Arab world is associated with a variety of variables, including nationalism and political Islam; But its most important relationship is in the form of individual behaviors and perceptions, which Anderson describes as "imaginary communities" (Anderson, 1983, 26).

Elites and Security Apparatus

Herob identifies six key factors that rationally justify the Arab revolutions: First, most Arab governments have become corrupt, largely in the hands of corrupt family businessmen, and are controlled by a limited number of opportunistic elites, all of whom support them. The security apparatuses are ruthless, and these security apparatuses and the ruling elite are also unsympathetically supported by Western governments. Corruption and abuse have spread to all sectors of economic, political and social life, and people no longer want to be humiliated, so they have risen to create their own viable economic and political system. Second, the uprisings challenged the repeated claims of authoritarian Arab rulers that they might be replaced by the rise of democratic Islamists. The Arab youth succeeded in mobilizing the silent majority of the society, who insisted that most Arabs were sufficient for the status quo. Third, this change that is sweeping the Arab world is not the product of the will of influential leaders or military coups and foreign intervention. Rather, it stems from the will of the Arab youth because they believe that the people are the legitimate actors of change and that the fate of the Arabs is in their own hands. Fourth, the widespread Arab protest is essentially political. Demands for jobs or living conditions are certainly important and may be motivating, but political demands are very important. For example, the central slogan in Tunisia was: We are ready to live with empty bread and water, but without Ben Ali. The influential rulers and their foreign backers, who had based their stability and survival on the armed security forces, could no longer use this opportunity. They demonstrated the emptiness of democratic principles, and sixth, the satellite coverage and mass media of these protests prevented the security services and intelligence services from suppressing these electronic civil resistance movements. In the face of this unarmed presence and will. Mass and under the open watch of the eyes of the world, the security apparatus and the Arab regimes could not resist and it was proved that they are paper tigers (Hroub, 2011).

Political-Military Alliance with Foreign Powers

Another explanatory factor for the stability and survival of the Arab monarchies is their coalition building. Yom sees the survival of the Arab kingdom as the result of foreign support: there was an international supportive environment, which for some countries means foreign financial assistance and comprehensive support to foreign powers, and for others it means access to staggering revenues. Oil is due to the prosperity and prosperity of global markets, and thanks to the prosperity of oil revenues, these governments have survived (Yom, 2012, Feb).

Some scholars have compared the recent US invasion of the Arab world with Napoleon's invasion of the Islamic world in 1898. Because Napoleon used the pretext of "expanding freedom for the Arab world and ending a tragedy for the Arabs." Two famous American historians, Richard Bolt of the University of California and Young Cole of the American World Institute, made the same comparison in August 2007. His intention is to liberate Egypt from the oppression of the Mamluks, 11 (bulletin, 2007).

Napoleon and American leaders (from Bush and Obama to Trump and Biden) used propaganda to promote freedom, democracy, and human rights. Both Western leaders attacked and occupied a

predominantly Muslim country. They both dreamed of a great Middle East, and both found themselves embroiled in long, bitter, victorious, and erosive guerrilla wars. Neither of these two Western leaders defended true democracy, its roots and foundations, but both used symbols and signs to provoke the local or local public, and a large number or often of subjects and individuals under control and domination. These two governments or two leaders quickly realized that they were facing occupation, not freedom (Cole, 2007, 12).

In the Arab world, when the people could no longer tolerate the authoritarian regimes of their society and revolted, the supporters and claimants of freedom resorted to the most brutal tactics, including resorting to general and widespread shooting against the people in Cairo and even mosques. Every law in their book of freedom was violated and all laws promoting freedom or respect for Islam were removed. Al-Azhar was occupied and discredited. Patterns of political behavior of societies originate from the social and cultural infrastructure of each society and pave the way for various actions in the field of politics. In explaining the paradox that the actions of the political behavior of societies are based on instinct or are a function of the behavior of the ruling political elite or go back to historical, cultural and social contexts and reasons, there is an endless controversy among researchers. Wilfredo Pareto considers the role of inner instincts in shaping the political culture of societies. From this point of view, elites can regulate social and political behavior and organize social groups in line with their goals; While general groups in society play a functional role in political action (el affendi, 2011, 11). It shows that variables of development and progress such as income and standard of living, education, neighborhood policies and policies, policies of previous periods and the historical effects of colonialism affect the democratic process to varying degrees. And Moqaddisi (2007) found that these variables of modernity and progress can not adequately explain the failure of democracy in the Arab world. These factors are: the relationship between oil welfare and democracy and the effects of the policies of the great powers and the pursuit of regional conflicts are important and influential factors in the process of failure of democracy and lack of political and economic development in the Arab world (massad and kanaan, 2014, 86-87) Some believe that multi-ethnic communities are more prone to scratches They are in conflict and therefore less able to maintain democracy. But in addition to these factors, civil and regional wars and the geopolitics of the region are also among the important factors in the lack of democracy in the Arab countries of the region.

The Strategic Position of the Arab Countries, Oil and the Strategic Interests of the West in the Region

The geographical location of the Arab countries has also led to more involvement of Western powers, especially Britain and the United States in these countries. Therefore, these conditions have changed the balance of power in favor of local rulers. The rulers of the region have always sought the approval and support of Britain and the United States, and this has left the Arab states with little incentive to bargain and negotiate with different sections of society. This has allowed them to meet society's demands for political participation. They seem to be ignored. In pre-oil Kuwait, for example, the rulers needed traders to earn their own money and expenses, and this led to the control and management of the democratic tendencies of the Arab emirs, and they even had to give political power to traders to gain their financial support. Oil, the dependence and need of the Kuwaiti rulers for traders was eliminated, and with the help of oil, they bought both the opposition and became independent of traders. In Saudi Arabia, given its strategic location and the subsidies it receives from the United States and Britain, Saudi rulers do not feel the need to compromise and negotiate with domestic groups in exchange for financial support. Thus, the Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf were able to make political and economic demands. Ignore society and, if necessary, use violent means to counter any internal challenge. In Saudi Arabia, Wahhabi and Wahhabi groups united with Al Saud and established an authoritarian regime (204-200 atallah, 2014). In practice, Saudi Arabia claimed to implement the Brezhnev 21st Century Doctrine (for privacy and creating a safe margin) and defined its doctrine as follows: No revolution in Saudi Arabia's neighboring and border countries will be tolerated and accepted. To take. The other monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council also welcomed and followed this Saudi doctrine. Like Russia in 1848 and 1968, Saudi Arabia and the United States have become supporters of counter-revolution and anti-change and democracy in the region. Saudi Arabia has criticized the performance of Europe and the United States in this regard, calling Obama's May 19, 2011 speech on the Arab Spring (Islamic Awakening) nonsense. Despite the frictions and tensions, the

truth is that the United States remains the main supporter of Saudi Arabia and Israel. Over the decades, Washington has provided tens of billions of dollars in vital weapons and intelligence support for the war against the Houthis, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iraqi government, the Nasserites, the Ba'athists, the Iranians, and al-Qaeda. Al-Saud is far more important than the rebuke, mild and temporary criticism of US officials against the existing laws against women driving in Saudi Arabia. In other words, US officials do not overlook the benefits of arms sales and the oil market and Saudi Arabia's strategic position and strategic considerations, and therefore it is with these strategic interests in mind that pursuing change and reform and defending the rights of Saudi women and people. He refuses and is content with a mild criticism at most. Therefore, the United States and Saudi Arabia are the biggest counter-revolution and the biggest opponents of democracy, and they have dealt severely with the popular revolutions in the region in practice, and have prevented fundamental changes at the hands of the people of the region in the Arab world. \$ 60 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia, especially for the Special Guard, the National Guard and helicopters, etc., all to ensure the national security of Saudi Arabia (al-rashed, 2002, 60). Or colonization has imposed political boundaries on newly established countries, thus exacerbating ethnic divisions and divisions. Oil and water are two variables that have made the Middle East a hotbed of Western and terrorist influence. Drought has led to the production of violence and the use of tools by terrorists such as ISIS and its Western backers.

Government, Personal and Repressive Government

Other scholars believe that the abundance of oil resources has led to the consolidation and perpetuation of authoritarian Arab regimes. These countries have been able to buy the opposition by buying and exporting oil, and thus maintain their authoritarian rule. Hence, oil rents have a negative impact on democracy. In all his work on the control and monopoly of a family, Herb sees the involvement of family members and personal government in key decisions as a key factor in the survival of the Arab kingdoms. Herb also distinguishes between two forms of dynasty and monarchy. In the five monarchical countries of the Persian Gulf, the ruling families make political decisions by consensus. The ruling family acts as a governing institution and has a monopoly on key positions in the management of the country and security systems (Herb, 1999, 235).

Mahdavi defines the renter government as a country that receives a significant amount of regular foreign rents. The rentier government theory emphasizes the political economy of the so-called oil kingdoms. According to Giacomo Luciani, the survival of the Arab kingdoms in the Persian Gulf can be justified through the influence of a huge and uninterrupted rent, and the reason for this is the huge and continuous rent influence. The survival of the oil-rich Arab states depends on this income and the ability to export oil and natural gas to world markets, as well as their survival due to the significant rent payments and subsidies given by Saudi Arabia to other Arab kingdoms and Saudi Arabia usually to other kingdoms. Arabs such as Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain provide abundant rent assistance (1-17.) Luciani 2009 Oil prosperity in Saudi Arabia boosts payments to Saudi youth Social services should benefit the lower and middle classes. Thus, this oil welfare led some sections of society and the government hierarchy to conclude that their interests were to maintain the status quo. Another result of oil revenues was that of religious elites and many The Saudi people felt that the Saudi regime was sacrificing and selling its Islamic heritage to the United States for the benefits of oil, weapons and oil affairs. The oil welfare made a large number of elites inside and outside Saudi Arabia very rich. The continuation of the rule of the Saudi dynasty is the best guarantee of stability and elimination of fear and anxiety they see radical Islamic groups such as the Wahhabis as coming to power because many Wahhabis and some Islamists want expelled foreigners, including Americans, to fight injustice, as well as the less aristocratic lives of Saudi rulers and officials. Other Saudi allies have little interest in the survival of the Saudi royal family. The small population also benefits the Saudi regime and makes it easier to control society (Price, 1962-189, 1962).

Lack of Democratic Institutionalization

One of the key factors in the formation of a democratic political system and the development of democracy is the creation of new institutions with legitimate power so that it can stand against another (Table 1). Most importantly, a core aspect of democracy is the centers of oversight of state power and the

giving of balance to any unit or institution within the state. Such systems require strong supranational institutions (Islamic civil society) that are able to repel and limit any undesirable expansionism and the authority of the institution of an authoritarian Arab state. There should be several powerful institutions within the government (independent judiciary, non-political army and respected oversight bodies so that no unit or group can decide on the various issues of the country separately and go its own way, even the president and The prime minister should not have such absolute freedom and authority. Power is definitely derived from the legitimacy of an institution, because without legitimacy, no institution can oversee or restrict other institutions and act within the framework of the law. Power can be derived from a number of factors that call for society to respect the actions of an institution or group, such as respect for the power of persuasion, the power to use force, popularity, tradition, and the norm of non-interference. Above all, it is dependent on the power of institutions, and to a considerable extent each is dependent on the other and reinforced by each other (Pollack,2011).

Table 1: Benefits and Limitations of Political Reform in the Middle East (Arab World):

Limitations	Potential benefits	Element
Limited scope of legislation, limited resources and specialists	Monitoring with the executive branch - articulating and detailing the demands of the people - providing and offering a way to sterilize the actions of anti-people regimes	Legislative Assemblies
Absence of any formal decision-making body - members of these assemblies and councils are appointed by unelected rulers.	Allowing the demands and demands of the people to enter the decision-making process of representing marginalized groups	Advisory Councils
In most countries in the Arab Middle East and the Arab world, parties are illegal - they lack the resources to promote and promote coherent guidelines - their parties are often elected by governments.	Expressing and representing different political views - paving the way for creating different conditions	Political Parties
Guild structures that require close ties to the government are often chosen and controlled by Arab governments or Arab rulers. Some sections of society remain unrepresented.	Citizens are organized to represent their own interests. Extensive oversight of government power - Providing venues and councils for political activity in places where political parties are illegal and severely restricted	Civil or popular organizations
Restrictive Press Laws - Formal and Unofficial Censorship	Helping the regime increase accountability - Allowing citizens to exchange ideas, opinions and debate on political issues	Press freedom
Judges are usually appointed directly by the judge - there is no independent litigation process - separation of civil and Islamic law - special court systems	Overseeing the executive branch - providing a process that protects the rights of the people and Islamic civil society - promoting the legitimacy of regimes	The institution of the judiciary and the rule of law

(bensahel and byman,2004, 68-72)

Numerous hypotheses have been put forward by various experts as to why democracy is failing and political development in the Arab world. Lipst (1959) believes that modernization is one of the preconditions for democracy and that modernization or modernization leads to democracy. In other words, as countries develop, they see higher levels of urbanization, education, and professional specialization, and ultimately lead to more political participation for their citizens, which leads to democracy. To measure modernization, they also use the variables of education, income and neighborhood policy (the effect of the type of political system on the neighbors of that country). Some hypotheses also point to the historical legacy of colonialism, meaning that colonized countries are less likely to become democratic. Because

colonialism has undermined and impaired economic growth and diminished the prospects for the survival of democracy (Gasiorowski, 8-11, 1995).

The most important components of Saudi Arabia's identity are Arabism, Wahhabi Islam, oil-richness, the monarchy, and reliance on the United States and the West. However, whether the United States and Saudi Arabia like it or not, a number of Arab countries have embarked on this difficult path to democratization. Iraq is one of the first Arab countries to take this path, although the democratization of Iraq has fluctuated and progressed in some areas. The Palestinian Authority held its first elections in 1996, but there are still many problems inside Palestine. Initial efforts to bring about democratic change in Tunisia and Egypt have been under way since the overthrow of their dictators, but foreign intervention has prevented genuine democracy from taking place. In any case, the many challenges facing Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Libya and other Arab countries have turned the path to democracy into a very deceptive path to change. Saudi Arabia is one of the countries that lacks the least democratic methods and practices. It is among the non-free countries. The Saudi regime has faced increasing domestic pressure to take some political action and reform since the first Gulf War, as its legitimacy has been severely undermined by its reliance on foreign forces to ensure the security of the Saudi regime. In 1991 and 1992, the Saudi people and various groups took their grievances to the King of Saudi Arabia, calling for a reform of the political system and the strengthening of the Islamic base of society. In March 1992, the Saudi regime took two steps to alleviate some of these concerns and concerns. King Fahd first published the constitution. Its clauses and provisions largely support the current state of society and the Saudi government. Including recognizing the legitimacy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and emphasizing the political Islam of Wahhabism. Certainly, this law includes some political rights, but this law does not have any mechanism to implement these rights. Second, the Saudi king himself formally established an advisory council, which formulated the advisory council under the traditional Saudi system. The functions and role of the council include reviewing and evaluating foreign and domestic policies, as well as introducing and proposing new provisions (Bensahel and Byman, 2004, 68-72).

The Role of the Army and Military Spending

Arab armies and militias are also a major threat to Norse democracies. At the same time, the Middle East and the Arab world are the most prone to the development and emergence of authoritarian and Western-backed militant and terrorist militias. The United States sees the Egyptian and Tunisian armies as guardians of the political transition in the region, while one of the main obstacles to deepening democracy is the involvement of allied and Arab armies and civil wars and US and Western intervention in the region. Strengthening the rights of minorities is one of the most important components of the rule of law in that society. What does not exist in the Arab countries now is the lack of rule of law and respect for the rights of religious and ethnic minorities in the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain. Feelings of fear, lack of respect and protection of the rights of minorities have eroded trust. It has undermined the foundations of a democratic culture and democratization process. There are many challenges that democracies are trying to overcome. They are not unsolvable problems, but they are not paper tigers. How the Arab world or the Arab world deals with them indicates the existence of various issues and problems about the future of these countries and also reminds us a lot about the future of this region (Pollack, 6, 7, 2013). The military spending of a country like Saudi Arabia in 2010 alone was almost equal to the total of South America and twice the total of Africa, and the five countries of Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan had the highest military expenditures on their GDP. The other countries in the region, Israel, Yemen, Syria, Kuwait and Bahrain were in the next five ranks, respectively. (Mitra, 2006, 9) The army and military elites play an important role in the success or failure of revolutions and movements in the region. Did the armies of the region stand by the people during the revolution or did they support the Arab governments? In some countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, the army protests remained neutral during its formation and peaked, but in some other Arab countries, due to ethnic and cultural heterogeneity and sectarianism, the army was divided. And some strongly supported repressive Arab governments, such as Yemen and Libya.

During his rule, Tunisian President Ben Ali pursued a strategy of repression, deportation, and expulsion. He did not bleed and calmly gained prestige among the Tunisian people at first. But in his third

year in office, he was able to replace more than two-thirds of the members of the Neo-Order Central Committee and replace them with his supporters. Ben Ali had a large and strong base of support in the security apparatus and the army. He took control of the government and the party and extended his sphere of influence to all social and economic sectors of society. The Tunisians became part of the Tenaha party. There were incidents that Ben Ali exploited. The first incident was the Persian Gulf War. Tunisia took a neutral position in the war and did not send any forces with the help of the coalition to fight in Iraq. Ben Ali saw political Islam as a serious threat to himself after the victory of independent Islamist candidates and the support of Iraqis in the Arab world against the United States. The victory of the Islamists in Algeria and its cancellation and repression of the Islamists by the Algerian government and Western intelligence agencies had a serious impact on Ben Ali, who under various pretexts began to arrest the masses and deport the Supreme Leader, Rashid al-Ghannouchi. The fact that Ibn Ali's government announced that it had discovered a conspiracy against his government, arrested thousands of Ennahda activists and convicted 170 people on charges of sedition, thus Bin Ali called this moderate Islamist organization a terrorist organization on this charge and He removed it. Therefore, Ibn Ali, like Burqabia, pursued a policy of total repression. The regime of Ibn Ali was also accused of widespread violations of human rights. Restrictions on the press and associations were among his repressive measures. People were deceived and they felt that religion should not interfere in politics because it causes violence. Ben Ali used these popular sentiments to suppress the Islamists and Tunisians (Hermassi 1991).

Conclusion

The findings of the present study emphasize that the Arab world is composed of countries that have significant similarities in terms of dependence on Arab tradition, Wahhabi religion, political culture and historical background. All of these countries are also exposed to the pressures of modernization and development and the waves of Islamic awakening. The political culture and behavioral patterns of the Arabs are not the only factors that have led to the failure of democratic procedures. To form democratic procedures. An important factor that should be considered in the non-realization of democratic procedures is the geopolitical factor and the interference and interests of foreign powers, especially the United States, Britain and Israel in the Arab world and North Africa. In Bahrain and Yemen, too, the people are desperate for sovereignty over their own destiny, and their political culture does not interfere with the establishment of democracy, but what has hindered the Arab revolutions and their efforts for democracy is the intervention of the United States and Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, the government has been able to use Wahhabi Islam to justify its legitimacy by relying on Wahhabi traditions, values, and ideologies. Coup and military governments in Egypt, such as al-Sisi, relied on nationalist and security ideologies and the interests of Saudi Arabia and the United States to oppose Islam and popular and religious forces, and these factors stabilized the authoritarian political systems of this group. It has been from countries.

Foreign actors such as the United States and Britain support tyrants or local rulers in the Arab world in creating and promoting polarized identities that enslave themselves or everyone else. This can be seen in the promotion of sectarianism in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Bahrain, which has been promoted by actors such as the United States and Saudi Arabia. The short-sightedness of political actors, including Western foreign actors, is linked. These predominant uprisings and excitements that have raised the region's political temperature to the point of volcanism are rooted in the region's current history and geopolitics (el affendi, 2011, 11). All these conflicts and polarizations are fabricated and created by the authoritarian Arab and Western rulers to maintain their power.

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