



## Regional Struggle in Indonesia: Study of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS) Upheaval

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### **Abstract**

It was conducted with a background of research on policy issues, early development of independence by the government, occurrence of upheaval RMS, and the impact of RMS upheaval against the Public in Indonesian society in general, especially in the Maluku archipelago. Starting from the background of the problem, the aims of this study are as follows: (1) Explain how policy early development of independence by the government; (2) Describe the process that occurs RMS upheaval; (3) Analyze what impact RMS upheaval against Indonesian people, especially people in Maluku. To explain and analyze the research problem, a structuralism approach is used, namely a system that combines an event approach with a structural approach, because the historical explanation of the event aspect is meaningless without displaying the structures and other determinants contained therein. Within this approach, there is a historical research method, according to Marc Bloch. According to Marc Bloch, which consists of four namely; (1) Formulation of research problems and historical observations, (2) Criticism or testing of data, is done by comparing information obtained from data sources (archives, contents of books, and research results read by researchers; (3) Analysis historical; (4) Explanation, the researcher carries out this stage by looking for the causes and effects of the problem under study. The results are based on the approaches and methods used in analyzing the research data. (1) Policy, the initial development of independence by the government, can be seen from the economic conditions of the war that the Dutch East Indies Government previously implemented and the Japanese Military Occupation Government continued. (2) Happened upheaval RMS was motivated by the separatist movement whose aim was not only to separate itself from NIT but to form its state separate from RIS. (3) Impact of RMS upheaval against the Public in Maluku; this was seen when in 1978, members of the RMS took approximately 70 civilians, hostage in the Dutch government building in Assen-Wesseran. Several groups also carried out terror under the leadership of the RMS, such as the Suicide group in South Maluku. And in 1975, this group seized a train and took 38 passengers on the train as hostages.

**Keywords:** *Regional Upheaval; Indonesia; Republic of South Maluku (RMS)*

### **Introduction**

Rebellion Andi Aziz, Westerling, and Soumokil have a similar purpose; that is, they are not satisfied with returning the United Indonesian Republic (RIS) to the Unitary State of the Republic of

Indonesia (NKRI). Their rebellion uses elements of *the Koninklijk Nederlands Indische Leger* (KNIL), who felt their status was unclear and uncertain after the 1949 Round Table Conference (KMB) in The Hague, Netherlands. Successful members of the Armed Forces of the United Republic of Indonesia (APRIS) overcame circumstances that made the public more enthusiastic about returning to the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The effort to unite and return the public to the Unitary State Republic of Indonesia ran into various problems, including fear by police who helped the KNIL, especially elements of Corps Speciale Troepen created by a captain named Raymond Westerling in Batujajar, Bandung. Terrorist acts are committed even until they eat the victim's soul because the terrorist act occurs in murder and persecution.

On April 20, 1950, filed a motion of no belief against the East Indonesia State Parliament (NIT) to push the NIT Cabinet to a putting position. Finally, the NIT cabinet disbanded and joined the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. Sookie, with its members no, will surrender to release Central Moluccas from the region of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Even in negotiations in Ambon with KNIL leaders along with Ir. Manusama proposed such an area of South Maluku be made an independent area, and when needed, a whole member of the council in the area of South Maluku was killed. But the suggestion, the, rejected because the member board precisely proposed that the proclamation of independence in South Maluku is the head of the South Maluku region, namely J. Manuhutu. Finally, J. Manuhutu, forced present at the second meeting, threat KNIL troop weapons (Sujono & Leirissa, 2007).

The "RMS Proclamation" was issued on April 25, 1950. The RMS kingpins gave two reasons for separating South and Southeast Maluku from the constitutional system in 1950. First, NIT could no longer maintain its position as a state not in harmony with the regulations. The Denpasar Congress is still valid. Second, RIS has acted contrary to KMB decisions and its own Constitution. In comparison, the "proclamation" itself was considered under the decision of the South Maluku Council dated March 11, 1947. The results of an examination of the 1955 RMS leaders in Yogyakarta, the text of the "proclamation" was compiled by DZ Pesuarissa, who at that time was the "minister of information," which, of course, helped Soumokil and Ir. Manusama (Leirissa, 1975).

The founder of RMS himself is Christian Robert Soumokil, former Attorney General of NIT. Before the RMS proclamation, Soumokil had gathered strength from the people in the Central Maluku region. Meanwhile, a group of people who expressed their support for the NKRI were threatened and put in jail because their support for the NKRI was viewed poorly by Soumokil. The leader's composition when proclaimed was JH Manuhutu as President and Albert Wairisal as Prime Minister. The ministers consisted of CRS Soumokil, DJ Gasperz, J. Toule, SJH Norimarna, JB Pattiradjawane, PW Lokollo, HF Pieter, A. Nanlohy, and Dr. Th. Pattiradjawane, Ir. JA Manusama, and Z. Pesuwarissa. On 27 April 1950, Dr. JP Niki Juluw was appointed Vice President of the RMS for overseas areas and based in The Hague, Netherlands, and on 3 May 1950, Soumokil replaced Manuhutu as President of the RMS. On May 9, 1950, the RMS Armed Forces (APRMS) was formed, and the KNIL Sergeant Major, DJ Samson, was appointed commander in chief of the war force. For his chief of staff, Soumokil appointed sergeant major Pattiwale, and other staff members consisted of Sergeant Major Kastanja, Sergeant Major Aipassa, and Sergeant Major Pieter. The rank system follows the KNIL system.

With the proclamation of the RMS, it received the attention of the central government. Hence, several Maluku figures in Jakarta and Surabaya tried to take a peaceful approach because they were encouraged to be sons of the region. The Maluku leaders are like dr. J. Leimena, Ir. M. Putuhena, AM Pellaupessy and dr. Rehatta (in Surabaya), who joined the team. They then left for Makassar. After the Leimena mission arrived on 30 April 1950 in Ambon bay, they only met the Ambon Syahbandar, assigned by the rebels to deliver a letter. It contained that the Indonesian government had to recognize the RMS before negotiating. Leimena rejected this. Because he came with the team not as a government envoy but of his own free will as a native of the region, however, his helping hand was still rejected. Finally, after APRIS blockaded Ambon Island, and the peaceful path that was carried out was not

successful, there was no other way; the government had to maintain Indonesia's national unity by force of arms (Pelealu, Dasfordate, & Winoto, 2021).

The RMS incident occurred in 1950 and paralyzed its supporting troops through Indonesian military operations throughout Central Maluku in the early 1960s (RZ Leirissa, 1975). However, this event in Indonesian historiography does not look like the events of Permesta, APRA, Andi Azis, etc. In Indonesian historiography, the 1950s with historical events seem to have been overlooked and directly during the New Order era. As stated by Adrian Vickers (2008) in his article entitled: "*Why was the 1950s important for Indonesian studies*". According to Vickers (2008), "the 1950s remained a problem because it involved sensitive issues regarding, such as how the Indonesian state and nation were formed, the very different nature of Indonesian society in that era, and issues of class and socialism, which not commonly discussed.

On the other hand, foreign historians are the same, ignoring this period, sometimes for reasons similar to those of Indonesian historians. The period of the 1950s with historical events is considered sensitive to be researched and written about to decorate Indonesian historiography because actions were seen as saving and had been committed in the face of the nation's children who were at odds with the government. When efforts to build democratic institutions and regional autonomy failed in the 1950s owing to Soekarno's authoritarian nationalism, Indonesia was still a country without a history because the 1957 constituents' aim to write a new national history did not materialize.

### ***Historiographical Review***

According to sources RIS government, Soumokil ran themself to the region adjacent east, namely Ambon; he left there with up aircraft combat force land Dutch. Under the leader of Soumokil and several leading political and military leaders, the South Maluku Council, which is necessary, noted that board this established During the period of Dutch colonization, proclaimed independence South Maluku region. Board stated that the action was conducted because East Indonesia is not capable defend n its position as a constituent country of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as because various measures Rich related to East Indonesia were contrary to the content Conference Table Round. Ambon, the most densely populated island in South Maluku, has been the place for recruiting primary member KNIL troops for more than one century (Kahin, 2013). Several prominent families on the island helped by a father or active sibling Became KNIL soldiers or got top pension fund service in Century then. Though there is a guarantee from the RIS community government feel afraid that the dissolution of the KNIL to result in the loss of job or seekers' retirement living families. Besides that, Ambon culture before colonialism had already vanished compared with almost everything region in Indonesia. Residents do not have enough awareness of civitas culture with framework movement independence in Indonesia the Javanese and Sumatra reached within eastern Indonesia such as South Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, Bali, and North Maluku.

So within reason, no exists certainty, dignity, and economy (because no, he explained KNIL soldiers). Because of different cultures, particularly in religious matters (more than half of Ambon's population is Christian), partly significant, the Ambonese support that. However, no one could say whether the majority of Ambonese felt Thing since early RMS was a State mainly military arranged by the Constitution military with pressure big enough from group military, including some remaining KNIL officers active. Thus at the time of the beginning rebellion, the journalist's special office news *Anet* owned by the Dutch, knew from sources in Jakarta that KNIL troops stationed in Ambon supported Proclamation Maluku independence. Seeds were obtained from a book entitled Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia.

## ***Fact Explanation Theory***

In line with the research methodology used in this study, for the description of the problem to find the causes and effects of the pain under investigation, Charles Tilly's theory of fact explanation (1978), namely "*Collective Action*," is used. Based on the theory of "*Collective Action*," every historical event is based on a desire or interest. To realize this desire, an organization that functions as a forum for mobilizing personnel, funds, and facilities to create *collective action is needed*. However, in the process, there is pressure from the opposing side. Still, there is also an opportunity to take advantage of capabilities and apply pressure through joint action. In the context of this research, Soumokil formed the RMS, making the RMS a vessel or organization to bolster power, human resources, facilities, and funds for joint action (joint action). However, in acting, the RMS had to face the government (NKRI), which put pressure on them. Still, there were opportunities (opportunities) to use the facilities and capabilities they had to exert pressure on (Bloch, March 1988).

## ***Research Methods***

### **Research Approach**

Its approach uses a Structuralism Approach. A structuralism approach is an approach that combines an event approach with a structural approach because the historical explanation of the event aspect is meaningless without displaying the structures and other determinants contained therein (Bloch, March 1988). The combination of techniques in question is a structural approach, as stated by Christopher Lloyd, with the following line of thought: The application of this approach is as follows (Lloyd, 1993). Historical Environment, Indonesia, precisely Ambon, South Maluku, became where the RMS regional upheaval took place. Sookie is a human who acts as a figure forming the RMS. Social transformation or reproduction is the social change that results from the actions of humans. Soumokil created the RMS because he wanted to separate South Maluku from NIT and the RIS government but was opposed by the government and some of the Maluku people, explaining the social history contained in the Indonesian regional upheaval, which is where the history of societal change occurred. In the structuralism approach, the basics of the event approach are combined with the basics of the structural system, namely unique things (events) with things that are *universal* (social structure). Apart from this, hermeneutics is also used to explain *causal factors*. Therefore, this approach also requires the form of a story to complete the analysis by utilizing social science concepts usually used to build theories or models (Lloyd, 1993).

## ***Research Methods***

The study uses historical research steps, according to Marc Bloch. According to Marc Bloch (1988), there are 4 (four) stages of the historical method in historical research, namely:

(1) *Studying* archives or oral testimony (interviews) means formulating research problems and historical observations. This step is based on the formulated research problem, so archives, books, and relevant research results were used in this study. (2) *Criticism or testing of data* is made by comparing the information obtained from data sources (archives, contents of books, and research results read by researchers). In this study, the data source on regional upheaval, especially the RMS case, was proclaimed by Soumokil in the Moluccas (Ambon). (3) *Researchers conduct historical analysis* by grouping the data collected by: (a) *generalization* or (b) categorization. Researchers use its "building materials" to explain facts. (4) *Explanation*, this stage is carried out by researchers by looking for the causes and effects of the problem under study, namely the causes of Dr. Soumokil's proclaimed establishment of the RMS and the

Indonesian government's actions to resolve the case. Therefore, the approach used is structuralism in historical research from Christopher Lloyd (1993; RZ Leirissa, 1999).

Document studies collect research data, such as archives, books, research results, and publications connected to the subject under investigation. The research step applies the first step, problem formulation, source observation, and the second step, criticism or data testing, in the historical method of Marc Bloch (1988). Data testing was carried out on sources obtained from historical observation processes. The data analysis technique applies the third research step: grouping data by (a) generalizing and (b) categorizing facts according to the problem under study. Furthermore, historical facts are generalized and categorized, and explained in the form of analysis and explanation of facts so that the historical story of the event under study. It is the fourth step of applying the historical method of Marc Bloch (1988) (Bloch, March 1988).

## ***Result and Discussion***

### **History of the Formation of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS)**

The Republic of South Maluku (RMS) was a region that was proclaimed independent on April 25, 1950, to separate from the State of East Indonesia (at that time, Indonesia was still the Republic of the United States of Indonesia). However, the Central Government saw the RMS as a rebellion, and after a failed peace mission, the RMS was utterly crushed in November 1950. Since 1966 the RMS has functioned as a government in exile in the Netherlands. On April 25, 1950, the RMS was almost/almost proclaimed by former KNIL soldiers and pro-Dutch members, including Chr. Soumokil, former attorney general for the State of East Indonesia, who was later appointed as President, Ir. JA Manusama and JH Manuhutu. The Central Government, trying to settle things peacefully, sent a team chaired by Dr. Leimena on a peace mission to Ambon.

The rebellion of Andi Azis, Westerling, and Soumokil had the same goal; that is, they were dissatisfied with the process of returning RIS to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The rebellion they carried out used KNIL elements, who felt their status was unclear and uncertain after the KMB. The success of APRIS members in overcoming the situation has made the community even more eager to return to the Republic of Indonesia. To unify the population into the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, terror and intimidation were used against the community, especially after Police and KNIL forces, members of Captain Raymond Westerling's Korp Speciale Troepen, assisted in the terror. The acts of terror he carried out even claimed lives because, in these acts of terror, there were murders and persecution. The seeds of Separatism finally appeared. The local government bureaucrats provoked the people of Ambon that the merger of the Ambon area into the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia would cause danger in the future, so all people were reminded to avoid and be aware of this threat.

On April 20, 1950, a vote of no confidence was filed against the NIT parliament, prompting the NIT cabinet to resign. Finally, the NIT cabinet was disbanded and joined the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. The failure of the rebellion by Andi Abdoel Azis (Andi Azis) led to the end of the State of East Indonesia. However, Soumokil and his members will not give up on releasing Central Maluku from the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Even in the negotiations in Ambon with KNIL leaders and Ir. Manusaman proposed that the South Maluku region be made an independent region, and if necessary, all council members in the South Maluku region be killed. However, this proposal was rejected because council members proposed that the head of the South Maluku region, J. Manuhutu, carry out the proclamation of independence in South Maluku. Finally, J. Manuhutu was forced to attend the second meeting under the threat of a weapon (Kahin, 2013).

But then, the mission, consisting of politicians, priests, doctors, and journalists, failed, and the central government decided to eradicate the RMS by force of arms. Troops were formed under the leadership of Colonel AA Kawilarang. On July 14, 1950, the APRIS/TNI expeditionary force began destroying key RMS posts. Meanwhile, the RMS, which concentrated its power on Seram Island and Ambon, also controlled the sea waters of Central Maluku and blockaded and destroyed government ships. Its rebellion was thwarted entirely in November 1950, while the RMS leaders exiled themselves to the Netherlands. In 1951 around 4,000 South Maluku people, KNIL soldiers, and their families (totaling around 12,500 people), fled to the Netherlands, which was believed to be only temporary (Vickers, 2008).

The RMS in the Netherlands then became a government in exile. On 29 June 2007, several Maluku youths raised the RMS flag in front of President Susilo Bambang Yudhono on national family day in Ambon. On April 24, 2008, John Watilette, prime minister of the RMS government in exile in the Netherlands, argued that establishing a republic was a dream in broad daylight on the 58th anniversary of the RMS proclamation of independence, which was published in the *Algemeen Dagblad* daily, which published articles on the strengthening of antipathy towards Jakarta. RMS's political goals have passed along with the weakening of the will to fight for RMS. No donors are willing to set aside their funds; now, the relationship with Maluku only concerns socio-economic issues. Prime minister RMS (dreaming) does not rule out Maluku's possibility of becoming an autonomous region like Aceh. However, he still emphasizes that the main goal is complete independence. The first RMS leader in exile in the Netherlands was Prof. Johan Manusama, and the second leader of Frans Tutuhunewa stepped down on April 25, 2009. Now John Wattilette is the leader of the exiled RMS in the Netherlands (Kahin, 2013).

Soumokol exiled himself to Seram Island. He was arrested in Seram on 2 December 1962, sentenced to death by a military court, and executed in the Thousand Islands, Jakarta, on 12 April 1966. The Dutch supported the RMS. Because the independence of the RMS, which was proclaimed by the majority of the Maluku people on April 24, 1950, in Ambon city, was opposed by the Indonesian Government under the leadership of Sukarno - Hatta, all RMS activists who proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of South Maluku were arrested by Military Troopers. The Indonesian government's military made the arrests, so the RMS top leaders took the initiative to escape to the Netherlands temporarily; the move of these RMS leaders received full assistance from the Dutch government then. With the willingness of aid from the Dutch Government to transport most of the Maluku people at the whole expense of the Dutch Government, the majority of the people in Maluku who were Christians chose of their own free will to move to the Netherlands. More than 15,000 Moluccans decided to move to the Netherlands (Leirissa, 1975).

The movement of some of the people of Maluku by the Sukarno-Hatta Government was issued as a "refugee for RMS supporters." Under the pretext of rebellion, the Indonesian government arrested RMS Ministers and their activists. They were imprisoned and tried by the Indonesian military court, with severe punishments, and even executed Dead. In the Netherlands, the RMS Government continues to carry out all Government policies, such as Social, Political, Security, and Foreign Affairs. Communication between the RMS Government in the Netherlands and the Ministers and Bureaucrats in Ambon ran smoothly under control. This circumstance caused the Sukarno administration to be unwilling to stand by and watch the Maluku people, so an order was issued to arrest all leaders and their personnel; in the end, the RMS Government in the Netherlands was the RMS Government in exile. With documentation and evidence of the RMS struggle, RMS supporters formed the so-called RMS Government in exile.

The Dutch government supported RMS's independence. However, in 1978 the Wassenaar incident occurred, where several elements of the RMS government carried out attacks on the Dutch government as a protest against the policies of the Dutch government. The Press in the Netherlands said the incident was a terror carried out by RMS activists in the Netherlands. Some say this attack was caused because the Dutch government withdrew its support for the RMS. Others claim that this terror attack was

carried out because the RMS supporters were frustrated. After all, the Netherlands did not wholeheartedly provide support from the start. Among the activities reported by the Dutch Press as terror was when in 1978, the RMS group took 70 civilians hostage at the Dutch government building in Assen-Wassenaar. During the 70s, terror like this was also carried out by several RMS splinter groups, such as the South Maluku Suicide Command group, which is believed to be another name (or at least a close ally) of the Merdeka South Maluku Youth. The group seized a train and took 38 passengers hostage, in 1975. There was also an unidentified splinter group that, in 1977, took 100 people hostage, in a school and at the same time also held 50 people hostage in a train (Leirissa, 1975).

### **The Indonesian Revolution Period (1945-1950)**

The revolution that became a tool for achieving independence was not only a central story in Indonesian history. All these erratic efforts to seek new identities, unity in the face of foreign powers, and a more just social order seemed to bear fruit in the post-World War II period. For the first time in the lives of most Indonesians, everything that was coerced by foreign powers disappeared. The independence that the Indonesian people obtained was not merely the result of physical struggle. Still, this independence was also the result of battle through diplomacy, such as the negotiations between Indonesia - the Netherlands, which were carried out to resolve the Indonesian - Dutch conflict (Leirissa, 1999).

The emergence of the *Bijeenkomst Federale Overleg (BFO)*, or the Federal Deliberative Meeting (PMF), was a forum aimed at managing the negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands in mid-1948, threatened with failure. The emergence of the BFO as a third force was hoped to resolve the Indonesian-Dutch conflict. Still, political developments led to Military Aggression II, so Yogyakarta was occupied, and Indonesian leaders were exiled to Prapat and Bangka. However, this act of violence to annihilate Indonesia led to rejection by the BFO (states) (Henk, Bambang & Ratna). Some members of the BFO saw the Dutch Military Aggression II as a betrayal by the Netherlands of its promise that the settlement of the Indonesian-Dutch conflict would be resolved peacefully (diplomacy). Their belief in Dutch lies grew even more significant when they read a circular letter from Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX that Indonesia's conditions were not as reported by the Dutch. Sultan Yogya 's response to this lie was that he was determined to confront the Dutch at any cost and reminded the Dutch that his determination was due to their actions (Leirissa, 1999).

In this context, the Dutch, who did not want to accept the UN Security Council (DK) resolution on January 28, 1949, still believed that the Republic of Indonesia was only a name. Meanwhile, Sri Sultan received the news via radio broadcasts that the UN Security Council would convene in March to discuss developments in Indonesia. In Sri Sultan's mind, what can be done to influence the course of the trial? One of the best steps is to show the world, especially the Netherlands, that the Republic of Indonesia still exists and that the TNI troops are still strong. Thus, the Dutch propaganda, which stated that the Republic of Indonesia had folded, no longer worked. Following this step, Sri Sultan sent a letter to the Commander of the Armed Forces (Pangab) Sudirman, who replied that for the attack, Sri Sultan should negotiate with the local TNI commander, namely Lt. Col. Suharto as the commander of the Yogyakarta area. After careful consideration, Sri Sultan and Suharto agreed to launch a general attack on a large scale against the Dutch position in Yogyakarta. The episode was scheduled to occur on the afternoon of March 1, 1949. And it turns out the general attack can be carried out according to plan with satisfactory results.

The general attack resulted in TNI troops successfully controlling the city of Yogyakarta for six hours. Only with the help of Gombong and Magelang did the Dutch drive back the TNI troops. That is what is known as the six-hour battle in Yogyakarta. The results of the general attack were then disseminated through the RRI guerrillas in the Gunung Kidul area, which the RRI captured in Sumatra. Furthermore, from Sumatra, the news was wasted on Rangoon and India; thus, the world knew that the Dutch had committed a big lie. Apart from that, the word of this general attack was also spread by foreign journalists who were in Indonesia. It turns out that this widespread attack can also affect the world view

(especially the UN Security Council) by emphatically stating that the military action of the Indonesian guerrillas greatly influenced and assisted the struggle to resolve the Indonesian-Dutch conflict (Henk, Bambang & Ratna).

### **Factors of Economic Difficulties**

India and Australia first carried out the world's reaction to the Indonesia-Dutch conflict. India defended Indonesia because of solidarity among Asian countries, especially after the inter-Asia conference in New Delhi in March 1947, which Indonesia also attended. The relationship between Indonesia and India was excellent because of Sjahrir's rice politics between 1946 and 1947 when Java gave 700,000 tons of rice to India, which was in danger of famine, and his tenacity in defending the UN charter. Meanwhile, Australia bases its defense on Indonesia in article 39, which states that there is a threat to world peace. In addition, the Australian Labor Party, which was in power then, basically sympathized with the struggle of the Indonesian people to defend Indonesia's independence. Based on these matters, then on July 30, 1947, India and Australia submitted a joint resolution to the UN Security Council urging Indonesia and the Netherlands to immediately stop hostilities and submit this dispute to the Arbitration Commission under article 17 of the Linggajati agreement (Ricklefs, 2008).

Responding to the joint resolution, the US considered the solution too harsh for the Netherlands. We feared Britain and France would prevent it from using their veto rights and Belgium in the UN Security Council (DK). Therefore, on August 1, 1947, America submitted a compromise proposal which was later accepted by the UN Security Council, which among other things, urged: (1) to stop hostilities; (2) to resolve disputes with the assistance of the Arbitration Commission or other peaceful means and report to the UN Security Council any progress made. The description above shows that the United Nations (UN) was directly involved in the Indonesia-Dutch conflict, trapping the Dutch in a challenging diplomatic position. India and Australia are very active in supporting Indonesia at the United Nations. The Soviet Union also lent its support. But the most critical role ultimately played by the United States. The Dutch, who made policy, and even the more progressive ones among them, firmly believed that history and common sense gave them the right to determine Indonesia's development. Still, this right was exercised by first destroying Indonesia. In addition, the leading Dutch allies, especially Britain, Australia, and America, did not recognize such a right unless the Indonesian people recognized it. That was impossible if the Dutch side had to rely on military conquest. They began to urge the Netherlands to adopt a less rigid stance and for the United Nations to become a public forum for examining Dutch actions. It only increased the Dutch's desire to find a solution as soon as possible in Indonesia (Ricklefs, 2008).

### **Fundraising During the Revolution**

The post-Dutch colonial Indonesia's economic history shows the efforts of the Indonesian government to transform the colonial economy into a national economy. The colonial economic structure, which has dualistic leadership characteristics and spatial description, is to be overhauled into an integrated national economy. Its view of the national economy has not yet found a format for application during the revolutionary period. At this time, the economic situation was still affected by the war economy introduced by the Japanese occupation government (Tilly, 1978).

The Japanese military government implemented a policy of mobilizing economic resources to support the advance of Japanese troops in the Pacific War. As a result, there was a significant overhaul in the economic structure of society. The economic development of the previous era stopped, and even people's welfare declined sharply. The plantation industry sector, the mainstay of exports during the Dutch East Indies period, experienced a drastic decline. The people's agricultural industry, which relied on rice, and had experienced self-sufficiency in 1940, declined sharply, and there was even a food shortage disaster. Other production sectors, such as the manufacturing, distribution, and service sectors,



experienced the same thing. The division of Indonesia's territory into three different administrative regions contributed to the destruction of Indonesia's economic transportation network at that time.

During the revolution for independence, the threat of the return of Dutch colonialism seized all the attention of the newly independent Indonesian nation. The production sectors cannot be run at all. Meanwhile, the domestic political situation was still seeking a form in harmony with the common goal at that time: maintaining independence. In contrast, the condition of the community places the main priority for the government cabinet program on economic recovery, even though, in reality, the recovery program is challenging to implement. The struggle to maintain independence was mainly supported by community participation. The strength of the battle is indebted to the rural population, who often supply the food needs of the fighters on the battlefield. Other struggle needs are obtained in various ways, such as smuggling and confiscating enemy property. In addition, Van Mook seriously tested the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia as a unit by forming a puppet state. The national struggle to restore unity has caught the attention of the Indonesian government. It led the Indonesian people towards recognition of sovereignty from the Dutch, followed by the restoration of the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia in 1949 (Burdam et al., 2018).

Gaining sovereignty and recognizing independence is not solving problems, especially in economics. Some welfare issues, such as improving living conditions and establishing a national economic structure, have resurfaced in a more palpable form that must be addressed promptly. Constructing a national economy returned and took center stage on the federal cabinet's agenda. The Indonesian government encountered difficulties beginning its operations as an independent and fully autonomous republic. The government has a budget far from sufficient to finance a development plan for that source of financial income that can provide these needs (Winoto, 2022). Meanwhile, the traditional taxation system cannot be relied upon as a source of income (Terry et al., 2018). Meanwhile, the alternative of seeking funding sources from the international community is an option that has never crossed the minds of Indonesian economic policymakers (Tilly, 1978).

In addition, the government faces the problem of establishing a development planning agency and improving public services through expanding economic bureaucratic institutions. Transportation facilities and infrastructure between levels of the government bureaucracy require controlled handling. Inter-regional transportation is still an obstacle in exporting financial networks to foreign countries. Additionally, regional upheavals, which threaten national integrity and integrity, cannot be ignored and influence government resource deployment.

The description above shows the economic difficulties faced by the Indonesian nation after independence. What is interesting here is the rural population's role in minimizing the Indonesian people's financial difficulties, especially during the revolutionary period, by supplying food to the fighters on the battlefield. Boeke was not the first to investigate the sociocultural components of a country's economic activity; he called it a "pre-capitalist society." economy, position, role, and purpose of the traditional village are nearly generally overlooked and seen as "things," not "subjects." In recent years, sociologists and anthropologists have studied the archipelago's social and economic life. However, very few of these studies have focused on the patterns and economic practices managed and led by "indigenous people" with "internal" forms of relationships and financial networks. In general, much of the emphasis in their studies is placed on the role of Europeans rather than the natives themselves, as studies have been conducted by Geertz (1963) and Burger (1980).

In a "little book" entitled "The Interest of the Voiceless Far East: Introduction to Oriental Economics," which was published in Leiden in 1948, and the Indonesian version in 1983, Boeke made us aware that in various studies on the economy, position, role and the meaning of a traditional village is almost neglected, even if it is mentioned, in so far as the conventional village begins to be involved or involved in urban economic problems. Traditional villages are always utilized as "things" or subordinate

to cities, even though, according to Boeke, for people in developing countries reliant on agriculture, traditional villages serve a crucial role in addressing communal needs. Even though the urban economic movement began to break through the walls of rural economic life in the mid-20th century. The traditional village was still able to maintain its principles and views of the "rural economy" based on the "self-sufficient economy," which Boeke called the "pre-capitalist economy" (pre-capitalism economy) (Vickers, 2008).

Based on this principle of self-sufficiency, economic life in traditional villages seems untouched by urban crises (production, trade, commerce, etc.) and continues to operate according to its dynamics. Boeke (1983) defines a traditional village as a "sovereign" home. The traditional village is a "producing unit" for the middle and upper classes (rulers, aristocrats, land/capital owners, etc.). It's a "social and economic obligation" for the lower class. For the protection and leadership given by the middle and upper class, this also means a form of devotion to the rulers of nature, the Almighty.

In short, their every economic activity is always subject to and mixed with various motives, namely, social, religious, ethical, and traditional motives. From the consumption side, the economic life of ancestral villages is built based on "self-sufficiency," in which almost all of their daily needs are produced/fulfilled by the traditional villages themselves. The ability of the traditional village to build such an economic structure because it is fully supported by the existence of genuine and organic social ties, the traditional tribal system, unlimited and modest needs, the principle of agricultural production solely for family needs, restraint on exchange as a tool for satisfying needs, and not too profit-oriented (non-profit oriented). The foundation of the traditional village economic structure is laid on the principles of "saving, remembering, and resting."

The social life of traditional village communities is difficult to classify according to their work (de Jong, 1989), unlike the structure of social life in urban communities, a clear and structured classification. Traditional village communities living in rural agricultural areas live in communities that tend to be "closed" and with a strong group spirit because they assume that individual existence lies in group or community life. Therefore, personal life needs to be regulated organically, subject to and adapt to the demands of society, nature, and the Creator. They are emotional, with "underdeveloped" intellectual abilities, lack discipline, and lack a sense of precision and respect for time

The existence of the above thoughts, attitudes, and actions is closely related to the "cultural value system and attitudes" that they adhere to and adhere to as well as "mental factors" that influence their thoughts, attitudes, and actions in their daily lives as well as in terms of making decisions. It's a collection of abstract concepts about what's vital, worthwhile, inconsequential, and worthless in most people's lives. As Boeke stated above, traditional village communities can build and develop economic structures in an autonomous and self-sufficient manner because they are fully supported by original and organic social and cultural ties, traditional tribal systems, unlimited and modest needs, and the principle of agricultural product (non-profit oriented). In this regard, work is seen as a "means of dedication" to moral, social, ethical, and religious obligations; or only limited to a human effort to survive. In other words, every economic activity, regardless of its form and type, is always controlled or within the "traditional context."

As a service and a tool to sustain life, for traditional village communities, work is not a "crime that has to be committed because it is avoided and limited as much as possible." For them, work or other economic activity is indeed something that must be accepted. Still, it must be done wholeheartedly, earnestly, full of hard work, and wherever possible without the help of other people so that it is of high value in the eyes of society. Working hard is a property of the traditional village society; consequently, there is no need for Hoselitz's "stimulant system," yet work practices and rhythms still need to be disciplined and harmonized with new technology improvements.

## Sources of Struggle Funds During the Indonesian Revolution

Since the beginning of Indonesian independence, the economic conditions of war previously applied by the Dutch East Indies Government and the Japanese Military Occupation Government continued. Some of the characteristics of the war economy, which includes economic resources, are directly or indirectly directed to meet the needs and interests of war. People's power was mobilized to help the military and political struggles. To suit the requirements and interests of the war, production is required. International commerce cannot function normally. National income has plummeted dramatically. By printing money, the government creates purchasing power. The trading structure, significantly damaged, gave birth to black markets. It caused the ministry of prosperity to be unable to work effectively, and even the office of the church of wealth, which previously occupied the former office of the *Departement van Economische Zaken* was moved to a remote area.

The budget owned by the Indonesian government is minimal. The Indonesian Independence Fonds Foundation (FKI) does not have a large budget to finance the wheels of government and pay for the existing soldiers and paramilitary. In various ways, FKI calls on the public and institutions to donate their money and assets for the benefit of the struggle. In addition, the government is also seeking loans to finance its needs by issuing Law Number 4 of 1946 concerning National (State) Loans. Residents are not allowed to carry out economic activities considered strategic, regulated, and controlled by state tools, especially the military.

In such a context, several decisions of the National Defense Council (DPN) serve as one of the foundations. In its meeting on August 6, 1945, the DPN decided the obligation to work for residents aged over 16 to 60 years in offices, offices, and companies outside the ministry for the benefit of the nation. The government adopted a policy to pay for the war by creating purchasing power by issuing paper money. The first Indonesian government to print money was Oeang Republik Indonesia (ORI), also intended as *an instrument of revolution*. Preparations for the manufacture of ORI, which were relatively ready in Surabaya, failed due to a large-scale battle in Surabaya.

Subsequent developments, the government, through the DPN, has issued various regulations related to economic interests. The circulation of goods from one place to another is under the government and military's control. Thus the problem of the distribution of money used. In this context, the Dutch side gained a strong position, starting to carry out an economic blockade by cutting off the connections between ports in Indonesia and abroad. Ships from Javanese ports carrying sugar, pepper, rubber, and tobacco were exchanged for dried fish, gambier, cloves, and other items confiscated by the Dutch navy. Economic relations, especially with Singapore through Chinese traders, received such a heavy blow that they boycotted the Netherlands.

On January 29, 1947, the Dutch issued an export-import regulation for the Dutch East Indies, a *de facto* economic blockade of Indonesian territory. Facing pressure from allies who blockade the economy, the Indonesian side carried out three strategies; *First*, try to make each region self-sufficient and meet the needs of its population. *Second*, establishing cooperation with traders from within and outside the country. *Third*, carry out a scorched earth policy against regional facilities that can no longer maintain. These three strategies were relatively effective after the military government was formed. Some military leaders try to fulfill economic needs by "smuggling goods" abroad or cooperating with other parties. In addition, several Indonesian sailors and navy sometimes broke through the economic blockade imposed by the Dutch, although many were arrested. One of the effects of this activity is the involvement of several military officers in the economy and working with business people of Chinese descent. This method only made the Dutch side soften after there were demands from the Governor of Singapore, Franklin Gimson, and threats of a boycott from representatives of the world of Chinese trade, shipping, and ports. Gimson even asked the British to protest the Dutch's actions which were considered arbitrary.

The economic blockade imposed by the Netherlands also caused tension with the United States. It was very detrimental to the Dutch diplomatically and benefited the Indonesian side. In this regard, several military leaders have tried to overcome economic difficulties by cooperating with other parties, especially traders. Chinese traders are generally adept at dealing with abnormal economic situations. Relations between Chinese traders and Indonesian military officers to meet financial needs continued, especially after the military was involved in the nationalization process. The third strategy is the scorched earth of several facilities that cannot be maintained any longer, complicating the economic situation—the group of people who suffered the most from the scorched earth policy were people of Chinese descent. To minimize the detrimental adverse effects, Siauw Giok Tjhan tried to convince the leaders of the armed forces to turn the houses on the side of the main road into strongholds of resistance, not scorched earth targets (Tilly, 1981).

### **End of the Indonesian Revolution and Transfer of Sovereignty**

On 6 July 1949, the government of the Republic of Indonesia returned to Yogyakarta, which Dutch troops had abandoned at the end of June 1949. Sudirman and other army leaders were reluctant to recognize the civilian authority they saw as having left Indonesia. However, the military acknowledged this when Sukarno threatened to resign if they did not. The problem was resolved by convening a conference in Yogyakarta and Jakarta in July 1949, at which the states had many interests in common with the Republic of Indonesia. These shared interests were based on their respect for RI's resistance and their disappointment at the negligence of the Netherlands in handing over significant powers to these states. The conference agreed that the Indonesian army would become the military force for the new United States of Indonesia (RIS) and that Sukarno and Hatta would become the president and vice president of the new nation.

The subsequent development, on 1 August 1949, was announced that a ceasefire would take effect in Java on 11 August and in Sumatra on 15 August. Before the ceasefire was implemented, Indonesian military forces managed to recapture most of Surakarta and defend it for two days. Subsequent clashes that stood alone continued until October 1949. However, little by little, the transfer of military control from the Dutch and illegal troops to the regular units of the Republic of Indonesia and the establishment of an integrated military power for the United Republic of Indonesia (RIS) was taken care of. By Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX as security coordinator. However, there were some turbulent areas, such as South Sulawesi, East Sumatra (now North Sumatra), South Kalimantan, and West Java, where this process encountered resistance from local illegal troops.

Based on the above conditions, from 23 August to 2 November 1949, a Round Table Conference (KMB) was held in The Hague, Netherlands, chaired by the Dutch Prime Minister, Drees. Muhammad Hatta led the Indonesian delegation, the Dutch delegation was led by van Maarseveen, BFO by Sultan Hamid II, and UNCI played the role of mediator. At that conference, each delegation conveyed ideas that then tended to pay more attention to their interests. Hatta dominated the Indonesian side during the negotiations. The formation of the Indonesian-Dutch union was very loose, in which the Queen of the Netherlands was the symbolic leader. Soekarno will become president of RIS, and Hatta as prime minister and vice president. Guarantees were provided for Dutch investments in Indonesia, and it was agreed that consultations would be held on some financial matters. It led many Indonesians to perceive the plans as unfair restrictions on their sovereignty.

The Indonesian side must also make concessions on two crucial and complex issues (Winoto, 2020). The Netherlands maintains sovereignty over Papua until further negotiations regarding the territory's status. While RIS assumed responsibility for the Dutch East Indies debt, which, after much haggling, was fixed at 4.3 billion *guilders* (f); a large part of this amount constituted the costs used by the Dutch in their efforts to quell the Revolution. The KMB produced complete agreement texts governing the relationship between Indonesia-Netherlands or RI and BFO on the one hand and the Netherlands on

the other, which were essentially divided into two parts, namely the leading and subsidiary parts of the agreement. The most critical provision in the KMB agreement is the Sovereignty Transfer Charter, which Indonesia interprets as the Sovereignty Recognition Charter. It then stipulates full and unconditional recognition of sovereignty by the Netherlands no later than December 30, 1949, for RIS, which consists of RI and 15 other Dutch-made states, except for Papua.

Subsequent developments, the style of the RIS government was governed by a constitution drawn up by the RI and BFO delegates during the KMB, based on the agreement reached by their representatives at the inter-Indonesian conferences in Yogyakarta and Jakarta in July and early August 1949. With the resolution of the problems, the most severe pain, the KMB was terminated. Although the DPR of each country was dissatisfied with the provisions of the KMB, the transfer (read acknowledgment) of sovereignty over the RIS was carried out. Thus, on December 27, 1949, the Netherlands officially handed over power over Indonesia in The Hague (Netherlands) from Dutch PM Drees to PM Hatta and Jakarta from Lovink to Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, each representing the Netherlands and Indonesia. In this way, RIS became an independent and sovereign country and received *de facto* and *de jure recognition* from the international community. After that, other countries began to exchange ambassadors with RIS (Sujono & Leirissa, 2007).

### **Impact of the RMS Rebellion in Maluku**

In 1978 RMS members took approximately 70 civilians hostage in the Dutch government building in Assen-Wesseran. Several groups also carried out terror under the leadership of the RMS, such as the Suicide group in South Maluku. And in 1975, this group seized a train and took 38 passengers on the train as hostages. In 2002, when the 15th commemoration of the RMS proclamation was held, an RMS flag-raising event was held in Maluku. As a result of this incident, 23 people were arrested by the police. After the arrests of these activists were made, they did not accept the arrests because they were deemed not under the applicable law.

Furthermore, they tried the Governor of Maluku and the Head of the Maluku High Prosecutor's Office for arresting and detaining 15 suspected of being the proponents and executors of the RMS flag raising. The flag-raising action continued, and in 2004, hundreds of RMS supporters raised the RMS flag in Kudamati. As a result of the raising of this flag, some activists under the auspices of the RMS were arrested. As a result of these arrests, a conflict occurred between many RMS activists and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

### **Conclusion**

Occur upheaval RMS was motivated by the separatist movement whose aim was to separate itself from NIT and form its State separate from RIS. Background to the RMS Rebellion The Republic of South Maluku (RMS) rebellion led by Christian Robert Steven Soumokil (former attorney general of NIT) is a Soumokil who was initially involved in the Andi Aziz rebellion. Still, he was able to escape to Maluku. The RMS rebellion, masterminded by the former attorney general of NIT, Soumokil, aims to release the Maluku region from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Before the proclamation of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS), the Governor of Nine Serangkai, consisting of KNIL troops and the Timur Besar party, first carried out propaganda against the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia to separate the Maluku region from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

On the other hand, in the run-up to the proclamation of the RMS, Soumokil succeeded in gathering strength from the people in the Central Maluku region. Meanwhile, a group of people who expressed their support for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia were threatened and put in jail because their support for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia was viewed poorly by Soumokil.

And on April 25, 1950, members of the RMS proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS), with JH Manuhutu as President and Albert Wairisal as Prime Minister. The ministers consisted of CRS Soumokil, Dj Gasperz, J. Toule, SJH Norimarna, JB Pattiradjawane, PW Lokollo, HF Pieter, A. Nanlohy, and Pattiradjawane, Ir. JA Manusama, and Z. Pesuwarissa. The impact of RMS upheaval against the Public in Maluku was seen when in 1978, members of the RMS took approximately 70 civilians hostage in the Dutch government building in Assen-Wesseran. Several groups also carried out terror under the leadership of the RMS, such as the Suicide group in South Maluku. And in 1975, this group once seized a train and took 38 passengers on the train as hostages.

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